Monday, November 28, 2005

F-16 outperformed by Russian aircraft!

Daily Times, November 29 2005
Tuesday, November 29, 2005
F-16 outperformed by Russian aircraft
By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: Pakistan may like to think twice about acquiring F-16s following reports that in the recently concluded joint US-Indian air force exercises, the much-vaunted aircraft did not come out the winner in its “encounters” with Indian Sukhoi-30 MKIs.

The exercises had mixed teams of Indian and American pilots on both sides, according to a report on Monday in the Christian Science Monitor, and observers say that in a surprising number of encounters - particularly between the American F-16s and the Indian Sukhoi-30 MKIs - the Indian pilots came out the winners. “Since the cold war, there has been the general assumption that India is a third-world country with Soviet technology, and wherever the Soviet-supported equipment went, it didn’t perform well,” says Jasjit Singh, director of the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi. “That myth has been blown out by the results” of these air exercises.

The Monitor report filed from New Delhi says, “But there are some signs that America’s premier fighter jet, the F-16 Fighting Falcon, is losing ground to the growing sophistication of Russian-made fighter planes, and that the US should be more wary about presuming global air superiority - the linchpin of its military might. ‘The Sukhoi is a ... better plane than the F-16,’ says Vinod Patney, a retired Indian Air Force marshal, and former vice chief of air staff. ‘But we’re not talking about a single aircraft. We’re talking about the overall infrastructure, the command and control systems, the radar on the ground and in the air, the technical crew on the ground, and how do you maximise that infrastructure. This is where the learning curve takes place.’”

While Indian bloggers are generally ecstatic about the performance of the Indian pilots against the American aircraft, an American pilot who participated in the exercise expressed disgust over triumphant Indian comments, pointing out that the point of the exercise was to learn and “for two weeks of training, both sides got more out of their training than they probably would in two months”.

The Monitor report quotes military experts who say that the joint exercises occurred at a time when America’s fighter jet prowess is slipping. Since the US victories in the first Gulf War, a war dependent largely on air power, the Russians and French have improved the aviation electronics or avionics and weapons capabilities of their Sukhoi and Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft. These improvements have given countries like India, which use the Sukhois and Mirages, a rough parity with US fighter planes like the F-16 and F-15C. China, too, now has 400 late-model Sukhois.

The report notes that “while the Indian Air Force designed the exercises to India’s advantage - forcing pilots to fight ‘within visual range’ rather than using America’s highly advanced ‘beyond visual range’ sensing equipment - both observers and participants admit that Indian aircraft and personnel performed much better than expected”. The Su-30 MKI “is an amazing jet that has a lot of manoeuvrability,” Capt Martin Mentch told an Air Force publication, AFPN. Manoeuvrability is key for missions of visual air combat. If it turns out the US Air Force did, in fact, “get their clocks cleaned,” it will have been the second time. In Cope India 2004, an air combat exercise that took place near the Indian city of Gwalior, US F-15s were eliminated in multiple exercises against Indian late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG-27 Floggers. In the 2005 exercises in Kalaikundi air base near Calcutta, Americans were “most impressed” by the MiG-21 Bisons and the Su-30 MKIs.

Maj Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing’s chief of air-to-air tactics and a participant in Cope India 2004, admitted that the US Air Force underestimated the Indians. “The outcome of the (2004) exercise boils down to (the fact that) they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected,” he told Aviation Week last year. “They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force. That was silly.”

One USAF controller working aboard an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) plane told reporters at Kalaikundi Air Base that he was impressed by the speed in which Indian pilots responded to target assignments given to them by AWACS. The AWACS, while operated by Americans, was acting as a neutral party, feeding target assignments to both Indian and American pilots during the exercise. In most cases, the Indians responded to target assignments faster than the American pilots did – “a surprising fact, given that this was the first time Indian pilots had used the American AWACS capability”.

Israel's Ambassador to the UN on Pak-Israel Relations

Daily Times, November 28, 2005

HARDtalk: ‘Pakistan will soon take additional steps towards normalisation of relations with Israel’ —Dan Gillerman, Israel’s ambassador to the UN

* President Pervez Musharraf has shown tremendous courage and foresight in leading Pakistan towards recognition of Israel
* If Palestine can co-operate with us, why can’t Pakistan?
* The Arab world didn’t condemn Iran as clearly as it should have
* Islamabad should be just as worried about Tehran as Jerusalem or London or New York
* It is up to the Palestinians to prove they can really run Gaza
* Israel does not target Palestinian civilians
* All terrorists are Muslims whether in Spain, England, the United States or Iraq
* It is up to the moderate leaders of the Muslim world to ask themselves what went wrong, and how it can be corrected

Dan Gillerman, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, is one of the most accessible ambassadors at the United Nations.

He listens hard and answers in careful, measured tones questions ranging from the statement of Iran’s president and the ideology of terror to the possibility of diplomatic relations with Pakistan.

After more than 50 years of refusing to acknowledge Israel, can Pakistan achieve normal relations with the country? In an interview with Ayesha Akram, Ambassador Gillerman says this isn’t only possible, it is inevitable.

Daily Times: Do you think Pakistan and Israel will achieve diplomatic relations?

Dan Gillerman: We are very interested in seeing concrete steps being taken towards the normalisation of relations between Pakistan and Israel. There is no reason for the two countries not to have diplomatic relations for there are no problems between Pakistan and Israel — we definitely don’t have a territorial conflict.

I think President Pervez Musharraf has shown tremendous courage and foresight in leading Pakistan towards more acceptance of Israel. By allowing his foreign minister to publicly meet Israel’s minister of foreign affairs in Istanbul, he made it clear that Pakistan is interested in attaining normal relations with Israel. I am hopeful that in the not so distant future, full diplomatic relations between the two countries will be achieved.

DT: But for the last 50 years, diplomatic relations between the two countries haven’t even appeared a possibility. What makes you feel we are nearing a breakthrough?

DG: Today, a breakthrough is desirable and possible. The situation in the Middle East has improved especially since the death of Yasser Arafat who was a real obstacle to peace in the region. He was never able to make the transition from being a Palestinian to being a true leader.

We now have a new Palestinian leadership which at least says it has forsaken terror. We have a courageous prime minister in Israel who is willing to go a long way to reach a settlement. We have an international community that seems greatly in favour of settlement. The ground is fertile for sowing the seeds of friendship between Pakistan and Israel.

DT: Wouldn’t Palestine feel Pakistan had abandoned it if we were to establish diplomatic relations with Israel?

DG: There is no reason in today’s world to exclude Israel. We are in dialogue with the Palestinians: we talk to them every day, our prime minister is constantly meeting Mahmoud Abbas, our ministers are regularly interacting with their Palestinian counterparts and our businessmen are meeting Palestinian businesspeople on a daily basis. Israel and Palestine also have military and security co-operation. So, why should Pakistan be more Palestinian than the Palestinians? If Palestine can co-operate with us, why can’t Pakistan?

I believe that by having diplomatic relations with Israel, Pakistan will help the Palestinian cause. If you don’t have relations with Israel, you are really not a player in the Middle East peace process. You can make statements from far away but nobody really regards you as a player. To become a player, you have to join the team and take part in the game. You can’t just stay in the stands and applaud or criticise.

DT: There is bound to be an out lash against Pakistan from the rest of the Muslim world if it was to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

DG: We have peace with Egypt and Jordan today. President Sadat once described Egypt as the mother of the Arab world. He also said that war and peace are made in Egypt. We have peace with the largest most important Arab country in the world. We also have peace with Jordan and we have good relations with Oman, Qatar and even Turkey. We have cordial relations with Morocco and I have visited the country three times. Why should Pakistan wait? Why let Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Qatar, Oman and Turkey take the lead when you are such an important country?

Do you think Egypt has lost any of its friends in the Arab world because of its ties with Israel? No. Egypt has full diplomatic relations with Israel: an Egyptian ambassador sits in Israel, and the country is playing a major role in helping achieve peace in the Middle East. Egypt continues to be respected and revered by the Muslim world.

DT: Given your optimism about diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Israel, do you think this will happen in the near future?

DG: At a dinner hosted by the American Jewish Congress that President Musharraf attended, he said and I quote: “As the peace process progresses towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, Pakistan will continue to undertake normalisation steps towards Israel until the establishment of full diplomatic relations.”

If you look at that statement, he is not saying diplomatic relations will be established after the establishment of a Palestinian state. He is saying as the peace process continues towards the establishment of Palestine. The peace process is continuing, and Palestinians are holding an election on January 25. Israel has taken a historic step in this process by vacating Gaza. There is not a single Israeli soldier in Gaza. So progress is being made and based on President Musharraf’s statement, we expect Pakistan will soon take additional steps towards normalisation of relations with Israel. There is no reason for them to wait.

DT: The president of Iran recently called for the annihilation of Israel. Are you satisfied with the response of Muslim countries to that statement?

DG: I was very satisfied with the international community’s response to the absolutely mad statements made by the president of Iran. I think the Arab world didn’t condemn Iran as clearly as it should have which is a shame because having an extreme fundamentalist regime in Iran, as manifested by these mad and scandalous statements, is as great a threat to the Muslim world as it is to the rest of the world. I know the Muslim world has its constraints but I’m sure its leaders were not very happy to discover another expression of terrorism from a neighbour.

DT: Do you think Pakistan has reason to fear Iran?

DG: It is very possible for a Muslim regime to be a source of terror against other Muslim countries. Look at Saddam Hussein and what he did to some Muslim countries. He wasn’t very kind towards Kuwait, and didn’t treat the Iranians well either. So it is not surprising to have an Arab or a Muslim leader who is a greater threat to the Muslim world than he is to the rest of the world.

Therefore I think for Pakistan to have a neighbour like Iran can’t be very comfortable. I don’t think they can feel very safe. Once Iran occupies nuclear weapons, which I think the whole international community is making great efforts to stop, it will be a grave threat to its neighbours.

I have said this before and I will repeat it today — Iran is not just a threat to Israel: it is a global threat. Its missiles can reach Rome, Brussels, and London, and so they can obviously reach Islamabad. They don’t even need far-range missiles for that.

It is clear that President Musharraf is trying to steer Pakistan towards tolerance. These are not exactly the policies of Iran. So, yes there is reason for Pakistan to be worried about Iran. Islamabad should be just as worried about Tehran as Jerusalem or London or New York should be.

DT: At the root of Iran’s angst is the Middle East conflict. Many in the Muslim world have expressed frustration over the repeated failures to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine. Do you think this time peace will finally be achieved in the Middle East?

DG: A lot depends on the Palestinians. Israel has taken very brave and painful steps in disengaging from Gaza. There is no going back on that — we are not going back to Gaza. That chapter has been closed. Now it is up to the Palestinians to prove they can really run Gaza. They want their own independent state: let them first prove, to us and to the rest of the world, that they can run Gaza. If they make Gaza a success story, democratically and economically, then we can embark on negotiations which will eventually lead to an independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. This is the vision of President Bush, this is the vision of the road map and this is the vision Israel has accepted.

The ball is in the Palestinian court. They have to prove they have relinquished terror and are sincerely committed to peace.

DT: You mention Palestinian terrorists. But, don’t you think Israel is also to blame? Palestinian civilians have lived in misery for decades due to strikes by Israeli soldiers which are supposedly aimed at terrorists but end up harming civilians.

DG: There is a very big difference between the two. On the one side you have terrorist organisations which have made it their official policy to destroy Israel and to kill as many Israeli civilians — women, babies and children — as possible through the horrendous and inhuman method of homicide bombings. On the other side, you have a country whose duty and right it is according to international law to defend its borders. When Israel goes on the defensive by targeting Palestinian leaders and by retaliating against Palestinian suicide bombers, unfortunately some times innocent lives are taken. But these lives are taken by mistake: they are taken as collateral damage of a much wider war. We do not target Palestinian civilians. Every effort is made, sometimes at the cost of Israeli lives, to prevent any injury or damage to Palestinian civilians.

If there was no terror against Israeli civilians, there would be no Palestinian casualties.

DT: Don’t you sometimes wonder at the cause of this terror? Don’t you ask yourself what is making young Muslims so desperate that they are blowing themselves up?

DG: Whatever its cause, terror is bad. There can be no justification for terror. Unfortunately, it does look today as if this is not just a war on terror but a war against extreme radical Islam.

In recent months, it has become more and more important for moderate Islamic leaders to look carefully within to see why this is happening. It is very easy to say terror is a cause of Israeli occupation. Is that the cause of terror in a school in Chechnya? It is very easy to say that terror is caused by poverty. Yet you see that the 19 perpetrators of 9/11 were very well off and came from middle class families in England.

DT: Don’t you feel the foreign policies of the West towards Muslim countries can be blamed for the rise of terrorism?

DG: No, I don’t think the West can be blamed at all. It is very easy to blame someone else. I think Muslim society should look very carefully at itself and ask why this is happening. I will never say that all Muslims are terrorists. But, it does seem that all terrorists are Muslims whether in Spain, England, the United States or even Iraq. It is up to the moderate educated leaders of the Muslim world to ask themselves what went wrong, and how it can be corrected. *

Saturday, November 26, 2005

Honor Killings in Pakistan: latest figures

The News, November 27, 2005
‘Alarming rise in honour killings in Pakistan’
By Azfar-ul-Ashfaque

KARACHI: Pakistan has witnessed an alarming increase in the menace of so-called honour killing cases as 4383 women fell victims to Karo Kari over the last four years.

This was disclosed by Sindh Additional Inspector-General, Police (Investigation), Nayyar H Zaidi, while giving a presentation on "Honour Killing: Analysis, Challenges and Strategies for Victim Support" on the third day of an international conference on "Honour Killing Murder in the name of so-called Honour" being organised by the British Council, Pakistan, at a local hotel on Saturday.

Unfortunately, the province of Sindh has topped the list as a total of 2228 cases of "Karo Kari" were reported officially during January 2001 to December 2004. However, the least number of honour killing cases were reported in Balochistan where only 287 incidents had occurred during the past four years.

According to the data presented by the provincial head of investigation, a total of 758 cases of honour killing were reported in Pakistan during 2001; 1015 cases in 2002; 1261 cases in 2003 and the number of such cases touched a record high in 2004 in which some 1349 women were killed in the name of "honour".

The province-wise break-up revealed that there were some 287 cases in Balochistan during the last four years. In NWFP, 299 cases were reported, in the Punjab a total of 1569 women had fallen victim to honour killing and in Sindh 2228 such cases were reported during the four-year period.

He told a questioner that prior to 2001 the incidents of honour killings were taken as ordinary murder.

Zaidi said that the main reasons for women falling victim to "honour" killing were those seeking divorce; who have been raped; who refuse to yield to family pressures; and in order to extract revenge from feuding opponents.

He informed the gathering that there were several laws to protect women. He said that the Constitution of Pakistan in several articles guarantees gender equality. However, he spoke about some discriminatory laws and said that the government was adopting various strategies for victim support.

He said that the National Commission on the Status of Women had been mandated to review existing discriminatory laws.

A new law, he said, had been introduced last year through which the punishment for honour killing had been enhanced and now minimum punishment was 10 years imprisonment. A provision in the criminal law was also amended through legislation, which previously allowed a compromise between the family members during trial.

He recommended that the State should assume responsibility to uphold the human rights and provide all citizens security to life and property without discrimination of caste, creed, colour, age or race. Gender bias must be eradicated from the state machinery and discriminatory laws should be re-examined and should be done away with. Police should be sensitised and it should register cases on behalf of the state where the complainants are not forthcoming. He observed that the civil society, media, judiciary, human right activists and police could play and important role.

On the social front, he said, women empowerment should be increased and illiteracy among women be reduced.

Professor Jahanara Huq, Vice-President of the Bangladesh-based Women for Women, highlighted violence against women in Bangladesh.

She explained different kinds of violence against women including that arising from matters pertaining to dowery, rape, domestic violence, incest, abduction/trafficking, acid violence, violence related to marriage, campus violence, feudal practices like Fatwa, medical abuse, media violence, and sexual harassment at workplaces.

She said that Bangladesh had no honour killing as such but had grievous, gruesome gender violence in its various dimensions. She said that 75 per cent of death, murder of victims was due to dowery cases. "Although anti-dowry law has been passed but it is not at all effective due to various socio-economic constraints and the legal flaws," she observed.

She said that rape in Bangladesh is so common that it extends from children of three to five years up to old women. She said that trafficking leads to prostitution or sexual slavery. "Every year about 20,000 women are abducted and taken to brothers in Kolkata, Delhi, Middle East," she added.

Dr M Ishaque Sarhandi, the assistant professor, Dow University of Health Sciences (DUHS), presented a paper, "Resources and Support Requirement for the Traumatic Management of Honour Killing Victims".

He suggested formulation of a national plan to address mental health in the context of disaster and integration of a specific disaster response component in the national mental health plan.

Wednesday, November 23, 2005

Rigged Local Elections in Pakistan: ICG

International Crisis Group
Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule
Asia Briefing N°43; 22 November 2005

OVERVIEW
Pakistan's military government rigged local elections in August and October 2005 to weaken further the mainstream opposition parties and lay the ground for its supporters to dominate forthcoming parliamentary elections. The elections were marred by serious violence, which may well become worse in future polls as ethnic, religious and regional rivalries are stirred up. President Pervez Musharraf's efforts to maintain military control over politics are likely to limit the state's mechanisms for dealing democratically and peacefully with its many internal conflicts -- unless the U.S. and others make clear, as they should, that they will withdraw political, military and financial support in the absence of genuine moves to restore power to civilians.

The government manipulation of the local polls involved gerrymandering of districts to break up support for political opponents of the military; reshuffling of officials to ensure those favourable to the military controlled elections in key areas; rejecting the nominations of opposition candidates; giving direct support to certain candidates in what was supposed to be a non-party election; and direct rigging at the polls, including ballot stuffing, intimidation and seizure of voting stations.

Crisis Group argued in a March 2004 report that the main rationale for President Musharraf's devolution plan was and remains regime legitimacy and survival. As the military-led government enters its sixth year, the imperatives of regime survival have become more pressing. To this end, the Musharraf government distorted its own devolution plan further through the rigged polls. This political engineering is increasing divisions at local and provincial levels, which in turn are producing greater political violence. At least 60 people died, and more than 500 were injured during the local elections.

The military government has presented its plan for devolution as an effort to improve public services, attracting considerable support from donors. But far from being a technocratic solution to the problems of local governance or an effort to empower people, the devolution process is a political project to maintain military power, something further revealed by the extent of rigging of the local polls. In the absence of representative rule, ethno-regional and political disaffection will continue to pose serious risks to the country's political and economic development and stability.

The election process risks worsening relations between the central government and the four federal provinces, which has already led to a low-level insurgency over political power and resources in Balochistan. Redistricting along ethnic lines in Karachi risks reviving the violence that blighted the country's main city for more than a decade. These elections have left political parties weakened and divided, have reduced political participation by women, and worsened local clan and ethnic rivalries. Limiting the political space for secular democratic parties has always boosted the position of extremist and religious groups in Pakistan.

Putting in place supportive local officials will help Musharraf ensure that his supporters win future parliamentary elections. In the 2002 election, Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) party won only a narrow victory because of opposition from many local officials, who can have a major impact on voting. The rigging of the local elections and the lack of independence of the Election Commission mean that there can be little faith Musharraf will live up to promises to return Pakistan to democracy and allow the next parliamentary polls to be free and fair.
Islamabad/Brussels, 22 November 2005

For detailed Report, see: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3799&l=1

Interview with Asma Jahangir (Asia Source)

Q & A Asia Source Interview with Asma Jahangir
by Nermeen Shaikh
October 27, 2005

Asma Jahangir is a leading human rights advocate in Pakistan. A prominent lawyer, she has worked both in Pakistan and abroad to prevent the exploitation of religious minorities, women, and children. She is currently UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the Commission on Human Rights. She assumed this position after being UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary executions.

This interview with AsiaSource was conducted while Ms Jahangir was in New York for the Citigroup Series on Asian Women Leaders presented at the Asia Society.

You have recently been appointed UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief. What does this position entail, and how does it compare with your work as UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions?

My work as UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief entails monitoring the situation worldwide. I have to monitor the growing trends, or patterns, of violations, and point out the countries or regions where intolerance is increasing. Basically my work is regulated by the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance. My previous mandate as UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions was a very hard mandate in the sense that it was concerning people's lives but this one is intellectually more challenging and more complex. The previous one was more or less black or white. So I think they are both very different and very difficult in their own way. But this certainly is more complex.

You have said in another interview you gave in 2002 that more than ever before, the UN "is an organization that is important at this juncture, because there is a lot of polarization in the world. And the United Nations is an organizational body where people, through their governments, come together." Do you believe that the UN, given its relative impotence - not to mention its hierarchical and exclusive decision-making processes - can bring countries and peoples together in a substantive way?

Well, I think the United Nations has to fulfill that role, yes. It was made for this purpose, and it is a world forum, an unparalleled world forum. It is true that it lacks, particularly, I would say, capacity, organization, and the zeal that it had some years ago. But that has to be brought back, and that is why we keep hearing of UN reforms. I hope these reforms bring a positive impetus to the United Nations, rather than the United Nations becoming more subservient to many countries that have power and muscle.

You have been involved in track two diplomacy initiatives between India and Pakistan which involve meetings between members of civil society in both countries. You have also spoken elsewhere of the absence of an "institutional way of sharing culture" between the countries of South Asia. What do you think the prospects are for more exchange, dialogue and cooperation across South Asia?

I think there are many prospects. To begin with, I think, we need to have cultural centers across South Asia as many of us have often recommended. We need to have cultural centers of each other's countries, and we don't have that. We don't even know each other's languages. We are more keen to learn other foreign languages rather than trying to learn South Asian languages. We have seen how people themselves, despite governments, have been able to exchange and cooperate at cultural level: songs and theater, techniques of theater, have been exchanged, but it goes beyond that. There is, for example, very unique embroidery in many parts of South Asia which people could share; and it is not only beautiful, but it can also be good for making money for women and other groups. It is also another way that the people of South Asia can be brought together. And there are numerous such examples.

You have pointed out in a recent article in openDemocracy.net that General Pervez Musharraf has been described by leaders in Washington as a "true democrat". How would you respond to this characterization?

Well, I think that it is a dichotomy in terms, because calling a military dictator a democrat shows either that people are themselves not aware of making the distinction, or they are basically not speaking the truth. And if I were a dictator and I were called a democrat, I would be extremely embarrassed. Of course I think it is also an insult to the people he's suppressing. I feel strongly, along with civil society in Pakistan, which includes lawyers, trade unionists, and other people, that US leadership has basically belittled us, and we feel more sure now that the future US policy is to prop up tin-pot dictators.

You also said in the same article that, "In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan's civil society feels abandoned by the international community. The contradiction in American policy between its foreign policies and its attitude to civil liberties is more pronounced." Could you elaborate on this?

Certainly. When we come here to the States, or sometimes when we are even in our own country, our interaction is basically with the media, and somehow they are always trying to press me into saying something positive about military governments. And I know that every government has done something positive. I am certain that even Hitler made some good roads! But that doesn't really at all, by any means, justify a military or a repressive regime. I find that kind of pressurization really quite, if you could excuse my saying so, obscene in a way. There are other examples that I can give you. In the past, for example, there was much more of a fuss made if people were arrested in an arbitrary manner, if extrajudicial killings were taking place. Now we have seen that the government is completely unaccountable in the number of lives that they may have taken. They are equally unaccountable for the completely disproportionate use of force that they may have used in the war against terror, under the pretext of counter-terrorist missions.

General Musharraf continues to be patronized by the US government for his alleged support of their "war against terrorism". Is it not the case that Musharraf has appeased and strengthened the most conservative Islamists in Pakistan - on issues ranging from religion on passports to the blasphemy law, to say nothing of the election of the MMA in the NWFP - and yet continues to be seen here, as well as by elites in Pakistan, as the only person able to prevent an Islamic revolution in the country? How do you explain this? What exactly are the connections between the military and religious factions in Pakistan?

I think the military have played their cards very well because that is precisely what they want to show to the world: if Musharraf is not there, then the Islamists will walk in. But I firmly believe that the longer he stays, the more the possibility increases of an Islamist government of some kind taking over. We have experienced in the past that whenever there has been a transition to democracy, no matter how rocky, how fragile it has been, the Islamists have been marginalized. But there is a nexus between the military and the Islamists regardless of the rhetoric that we hear, and so the Islamists become stronger and stronger the longer the military stays in power. And it may be a very bad marriage between the Islamists and the military, but I can assure you that divorce has not taken place yet. I can give you many examples that will show you that the tension is there, but they still work in partnership. They both need each other.

On a similar theme, an April 2005 International Crisis Group report argued that, "Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence of state policies of Islamisation and marginalization of secular democratic forces. Co-option and patronage of religious parties by successive military governments have brought Pakistan to a point where religious extremism threatens to erode the foundations of the state and society. As President Pervez Musharraf is praised by the international community for his role in the war against terrorism, the frequency and viciousness of sectarian terrorism continues to increase." Could you comment on this, in particular on how military governments have strengthened sectarian forces in Pakistan?

I read this International Crisis Group report and I agreed with every part of it, with the whole sense of it. We have identified particular patterns in Pakistan. When the government wants to divert attention, for example, there are immediately sectarian killings. This is something that columnists have commented upon and people have noticed. Other than that, there is patronage that comes from outside the country for many of the Islamist groups with the knowledge of the government and its intelligence agencies. We should not make the mistake of thinking that this patronage and funding takes place without the intelligence agencies of Pakistan being aware of it. These intelligence agencies are among the most competent intelligence agencies in many ways - in a very negative way. So they know what is happening. This is also why it is not the Islamic political parties, but it is these lashkars and other groups which are not even registered, which crop up once in a while and are involved in these attacks. There are more too. Each leader has only a few followers, but they have a lot of arms and they have a lot of money, and the government has done nothing to disarm these people so far.

But why is it that the report says that successive military governments have done this in ways that democratic governments have not?

The point of course is that the Islamists don't depend on democratic governments. They know that if there is genuine democracy, they are only going to lose their power and their importance in power politics. It is ultimately the military that is their friend.

But do they continue to work with the military even during democratic governments? Is this what they have done?

Well all indications are that they do continue to work with the military even when democratic governments have been in power. You can see how the military has used the Islamists against democratic forces and against leadership that has come in through democracy. Bhutto is a prime example of that.

It is also generally believed that President Musharraf is helping women and minorities in Pakistan. Could you comment on how his government responded to the widely publicized gang rape of Mukhtar Mai and the events that followed?

Well, in the beginning, the government was very positive about the case of Mukhtar Mai. But you must recognize that one cannot take out the rights of women and minorities from the whole system of governance in Pakistan. It would be a folly to think that a few people will get their rights while others remain suppressed because there have to be mechanisms that address these questions. There have to be democratic institutions that take care of the rule of law. When these are completely absent and work at the whims of one individual, then things become very difficult, and also have a different meaning. Take the case of Mukhtar Mai: as long as the government thought that she was their protƩgƩe, she was helped to "get justice", but once they felt that she was not towing their line, they were not willing to give her justice. Well, in this case, justice only means a form of charity coming from the highest person in authority. This obviously has nothing to do with justice. So there is no system in Pakistan. Minorities, in the beginning, thought that this government may protect their rights, but have now come to realize that nothing has changed for them. On the contrary, the government is too busy making and projecting what they call a "soft image" abroad to bother about institutional changes within the country, or to pay heed to what people are suffering at home.

How could Mukhtar Mai have ever been good for the government? Why did they support her initially?

Well, because they did benefit in the beginning. There were photographs that were taken with the Governor, with the Prime Minister, which were shown everywhere to prove that this government is very pro-women, etc. It is President Musharraf who has given instructions that justice must be done immediately. The government gave her money, the government gave her a lawyer, the government instructed courts quite openly, and this really upsets me because rule of law must be for everyone. And in this case, again, it was because of the whims of the highest person in authority.

What do you think the effects and likely consequences are and will be in Pakistan of the "war against terrorism" led by the US?

It is very difficult to say what the effects will be. One thing, however, is quite certain: as this war goes on, there will be a backlash. People already all over the world have very anti-US feelings, and more particularly, in those countries with unpopular leaders that the US is protecting and supporting and praising, the situation is much worse. There is going to be a big build up of anti-US resentment and there is going to be a backlash.

Would you say that Musharraf's government is unpopular in Pakistan?

I don't have to say it; it is quite obvious. If he were popular, then he would hold free and fair elections and it would be very simple for him to get elected and then he could turn around and tell everybody that they were wrong. But he isn't doing that. And I think there's a good reason for that. The other thing is that if the war against terror is going to be fought in the way that it is, the chances are that the actual militants and terrorists will only have more space, more freedom. They will soon realize that this is being done in such a clumsy fashion that they can get away, whereas innocent people will continue to suffer. The militants themselves will get even more support, social support for themselves. If so many people can be accused falsely, with no procedure, no evidence, how will anyone ever know who actually has anything to do with terrorism?

Why do you say it is clumsy?

In Waziristan, for example, many people have been killed. There is absolutely no accountability. There have been families with children and women that have been killed. Small fingers were found after bombardment. And no names have been given out. I mean there is no transparency at all. And many innocent people have been arrested, have been killed. How can such an operation have any legitimacy?

Tariq Ali on Amartya Sen

The Nation
Mystic River
by TARIQ ALI
(December 5, 2005 issue]
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051205/ali

The sage of Bengal has pronounced. Pluralism, we are informed, has an ancient pedigree in Indian history. It is embedded in the oldest known texts of Hinduism and, like a river, has flowed through Indian history (including the Mughal period, when the country was under Muslim rule) till the arrival of the British in the eighteenth century. It is this cultural heritage, ignored and misinterpreted by colonialists and religious fanatics alike, that shapes Indian culture and goes a long way toward explaining the attachment of all social classes to modern democracy. The argumentative tradition "has helped to make heterodoxy the natural state of affairs in India," exerting a profound influence on the country's politics, democracy and "the emergence of its secular priorities." This view informs most of the thought-provoking essays in Amartya Sen's new book, a set of reflections on India written in a very different register from his other books on moral philosophy and poverty. It is designed not so much for the academy but as a public intervention in the country of his birth, to which he remains firmly attached despite the Nobel Prize and his latest posting at Harvard as a Boston Brahman.

Although the essays in The Argumentative Indian were composed at different times, they have been successfully welded into a single volume. There is much to agree with here. Sen's lofty worldview remains staunchly secular and rationalist, as befits a scholar whose intellectual formation took place in Nehru's India, a historical time zone under constant attack today from Hindu nationalists on the one side and some of the more fashionable Indian luminaries of the US branch of the subaltern school of historians on the other. Unlike fellow Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul, Sen does not see the entry of Islam into India as a dagger thrust in the heart of Indian civilization. On the contrary, he argues that the effect of Mughal rule was beneficial. This was undoubtedly the case on the dietary front: The historian Irfan Habib has shown how the average Indian peasant ate better and more often in this period than under the British.

Given the title of Sen's book, it would be churlish to prove him wrong by simply nodding in approval, as is so often the case in our wonderful subcontinent. What follows, then, from this argumentative Pakistani is the expression of a few doubts concerning his central thesis and the odd complaint with regard to some omissions.

Can the lineages of modern Indian democracy be traced back to the holy texts, as Sen suggests? And does the affection of ordinary citizens for democracy have any material (as opposed to mystical) links to the arguments once heard by Buddha or King Ashoka (273-232 B.C.), let alone the Mughal emperor Akbar (1556-1605)?

It's true that disputes abound in the ancient Sanskrit epics. Their multiple tales are, as Sen puts it, "engagingly full of dialogues, dilemmas and alternative perspectives," such as that of Javali, the notorious skeptic of the Ramayana, who explains in detail how "the injunctions about the worship of gods, sacrifice, gifts and penance have been laid down in the sastras [scriptures] by clever people, just to rule over [other] people." In codifying the rules for debate in the Buddhist councils, Ashoka demanded mutual respect among the various sects. While the Inquisition was sowing terror in Europe, Akbar, himself a Muslim, ruled that "anyone is to be allowed to go over to a religion that pleases him." The interreligious debates he organized in Agra included Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, Jains, Jews and the atheists of the Carvaka school, who argued that Brahmans had established ceremonies for the dead only "as a means of livelihood" for themselves. Even the Vedic Song of Creation on the origins of the universe ends in radical doubt: "Who really knows? Whence this creation has arisen--perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not--the one who looks down on it, in the highest heaven, only he knows--or perhaps he does not know."

Yet the skepticism voiced by some rulers and reflected in ancient texts was usually, if not always, confined to the priestly elites. The model for the debates among scholars from different religions and sects that were organized by Akbar's court was little different from similar discussions a few centuries earlier in the camp of Mongol leader Genghis Khan (1162-1227). With this exception: Mongol soldiers were permitted to both listen and participate in the arguments. The Mughal courts in India were sealed off from public view: The courtiers listened and, no doubt, nodded when the emperor smiled appreciatively as a point was scored, but they did not speak. Only the emperor and a few of his close advisers posed questions. The tyranny of the few over the many--exercised through a ritual combination of coercion and religion--was never seriously challenged in India until the advent of capitalist colonization. Nobody spoke for the subalterns.

Unlike ancient Greece, there were no city-based institutions where important issues could be debated, and the overglorified village panchayats, or councils, were the domain of the privileged where the poor could only appear as supplicants. Ancient India produced an ugly caste system that led to early divisions and splits, but neither Brahmanism proper nor its wilder offshoots--Buddhism and Jainism--came even close to producing a political philosophy that could lay the basis for a popular or semipopular assembly like those in ancient Greece, whose formal decrees always began with the invocation: "The demos has decided." The assemblies in Athens were barred to slaves, but they did include peasant proprietors and even some peasants who worked for others. Hence the debates between rich and poor; hence the fear of the multitude evinced by the wealthy; hence Solon's New Deal-ish boast: "I stood covering both [rich and poor] with a strong shield, permitting neither to triumph unjustly over the other." But even these traditions, while never forgotten, disappeared completely. The idea of democracy re-emerged in the debates that followed the English Revolution and found institutional form only after the American and French revolutions.

Ancient India produced great poets, philosophers and playwrights, along with art forms, gods and goddesses to match anything on offer in Athens, but it did not give birth to an Aristotle. And nothing remotely resembling the Assembly in Athens or the Senate in Rome arose on the subcontinent. Surely this must reflect some deficiency. Despite arguments within the elite and some wonderful expressions of skepticism cited by Sen, the demos was kept under strict control throughout Indian history. Uprisings threatening the status quo were brutally crushed by Hindu and Muslim ruler alike. Superstition and irrationality were institutionalized via a network of priestly domination.

The resilience of Brahman traditions lay not in encouraging debate but in the power of the iniquitous caste system that survives to this day and pervades the spirit of Indian democracy. One wishes that Sen, a longstanding critic of economic inequality, had given us his views on whether globalization tends to weaken or strengthen caste chauvinism in India. When in the third decade of the past century, the "untouchable" leader Dr. Ambedkar insisted that his caste not be considered Hindu so that they, like the Muslims, could demand separate electorates from the British rulers, he was sweetly rebuffed by Mahatma Gandhi, no doubt for the noblest of reasons. Hard-core confessional elements in the leadership of the ruling Congress Party were only too aware that without the "low castes" being counted as Hindus their overall weight in the population would be drastically reduced.

What of India's Muslims? The Mughal conquest of India created a strong centralized state, but there was not even an embryonic consciousness of democracy, even in its most primitive, patrician form. The emperor was supreme. His subjects could plead for justice in his presence once a week, and if they were lucky they could be rewarded with a few coins and kind words. Interestingly enough, while all the existing texts of classical Greece and Rome were translated into Arabic during the eighth and ninth centuries, and while Islamic schools of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and medicine flourished in CĆ³rdoba, Palermo and Baghdad, the one genuine innovation of the Greeks--the idea of democracy--did not travel. The caliph was both the spiritual and the temporal ruler, and any notion of an assembly of equals would have been seen as a godless challenge to Allah's vice regent. The Mughal order in India was based on an alliance of the wealthy and the creation of a strong central bureaucracy with rights over large tracts of land.

Sen is correct to stress the tolerance of the Mughals, particularly Akbar, toward the non-Muslim majority. The reasons for this policy, however, were not simply altruistic. The Muslim conquerors, like the British after them, knew that stable rule was dependent on securing the consent of crucial layers of the indigenous elites. This they did successfully, and even the last of the great Mughal emperors, the devout and narrow-minded Aurangzeb, presided over an imperial army led by an equal mix of Hindu and Muslim generals. When the British East India Company's army secured Bengal as a bridgehead in 1757 and made Calcutta the first capital of British India, it did so with a very small number of British officers, European weaponry and local recruits on a monthly wage. Like its Mughal predecessor, the company was desperate for allies and often bought them in the marketplace. The Bengali Renaissance that produced Nobel Prize-winning writer and poet Rabindranath Tagore, filmmaker Satyajit Ray, the Sens and numerous others was the result of a unique synthesis between local tradition and imperial modernity, based on a capitalist economy. Without capitalism there was no Indian modernity. Democracy in British India (as in Britain itself) came a century and a half later as a result of pressure from below on the part of a growing middle-class intelligentsia in Calcutta. "What Bengal thinks today," declared the reformer Ram Mohun Roy, "India thinks tomorrow."

That is why imperial ideologues as well as colonial apologists like Rudyard Kipling came to despise Bengal. The Bengalis, in their estimation, were effete intellectuals ill equipped to fight, unlike the "martial races" of the Punjab and North-West Frontier. Kipling's fiction is filled with crude stereotypes of the dark-skinned Bengali babu (clerk) as contrasted with the noble and fair-skinned Pathan or the Rajput warrior. Better they were kept illiterate lest they become uppity like the Bengalis.

Even supposing there was a strong "argumentative" tradition in India 3,000 years ago, was this the frail aqueduct through which the democratic stream finally moved? Such is the argument of Sen and (in a more fashionable formulation) of postcolonial scholars who scornfully dismiss the suggestion that the British presence had anything to do with the spread of democratic ideas and the rise of Indian democracy. This is, in my view, a form of mysticism. We may not like it, but there is no denying the impact of 150 years of British rule in India, which brought capitalism to the country and overwhelmingly determined the nature and character of Indian institutions.

Sen accepts uncritically the historian Partha Chatterjee's argument that, in Chatterjee's words, the emergence of nationalism created


its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains--the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the "outside," of the economy...of science and technology...where the West has proved its superiority.... The spiritual, on the other hand, is an "inner" domain bearing the "essential" marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain...the greater the need to preserve the distinctiveness of one's spiritual culture.

Here one discerns a retreat from the secular definition of nationhood espoused by Nehru and a slide into the murky domain of Hindu nationalism, albeit in an ultra-civilized fashion. In rejecting the heritage of Nehruvian socialism for its statism and affiliation with the urban middle class, "left-wing" postcolonial historians like Chatterjee have eerily converged in their arguments with right-wing Hindu politicians, who insist that the content of Indian nationalism has always been spiritual, i.e., religious, thus excluding India's large Muslim minority from the national community. (When the Hindu nationalist brigade in the United States mounted a disgraceful campaign two years ago against the Library of Congress decision to award a research fellowship to Romila Thapar, one of the most distinguished secular historians of ancient India, a majority of Indian historians on American campuses remained silent.) What is "one's spiritual culture" and "cultural identity" if not religion, even if lightly disguised as the Cow Protection League or the National Fund to Rebuild Mosques? Was it possible for nationalism to move in a more cosmopolitan than spiritual direction?

This raises the Gandhi question. Was it necessary for the Mahatma to use spiritual (Hindu) imagery and language to rouse the majority of the countryside from their torpor? Nehru and Tagore did not think so and argued heatedly with the old fox, but on this Gandhi would not budge. It was they who gave up, Tagore in despair and Nehru in the half-hope that the damage was reparable. But it wasn't, and it led ultimately to the fatal breach with secular Muslims, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. That there were other straws in the nationalist breeze was revealed time and time again in the wave of strikes that paralyzed the country in late 1945 and then again in 1946, when Muslim, Hindu and Sikh naval ratings united against the British and seized the ships, raising the banner of revolution. This was the most significant mutiny in the history of the British Empire. On the advice of Jinnah and Gandhi, the sailors surrendered "to India not the British."

The attachment to the "distinctiveness of one's spiritual culture" undoubtedly helped provoke the bloody partition of the subcontinent, but the institutions that provided the spinal cord of the new states owed little to spiritual traditions. They were British creations, and Parliament was not the only one. It certainly helped to unite India, but in neighboring Pakistan it is the army and, to a lesser extent, the civil service, both creations of the Raj, that have ruled the country. What happened to the "argumentative" tradition here? Taxila (near Islamabad) was, after all, the site of one of the world's first large (Buddhist) universities centuries before the Christian Era. It is not that most Pakistanis did or do not like democracy. A new imperial power decreed that the army was the most reliable guarantor of stability and order in the new country. Here Washington has been consistent. Only this year Condoleezza Rice, on a visit to Islamabad, praised Gen.Pervez Musharraf and his regime--apparently secular and autocratic--as the model for the Muslim world. (Including Iraq?)

In India democracy has become embedded as the only acceptable form of rule largely because of geography. If Pakistan split into two after an eleven-year military dictatorship from 1958 to '69, what would an attempt to impose a military regime in India have done to that country? Created a three-way split? Or even more fragments? The regional elites realized that this would be an economic disaster, and the unity of India under a democratic umbrella became the common sense of the country. It is this and mass hostility to autocracy that explains the longevity of the democratic system, but one should not underestimate the power of turbo-propelled capitalism to weaken democracy in India just as it is doing in its heartlands. Indians may want democracy, but it is hardly a prerequisite for a dynamic capitalism. Europe demonstrated this during the first 300 years of capitalism; China does so today.

The essay on the giant of Bengali letters, Tagore (1861-1941), who died six years before India and his beloved Bengal was partitioned, is studded with gems. Sen knows Tagore's work well, and his grandfather, a distinguished historian of Hinduism, worked with the great poet in Santiniketan, a progressive educational academy that provided the inspiration for Dartington Hall in England. Tagore's standing in the West has been subject to many fluctuations. His mystic-spiritual side appealed to many Westerners, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, but as Sen explains, this was only one side of the man. In Bengal and India he was the voice of reason, a cosmopolitan who encouraged the self-emancipation of the people and urged them to free themselves from the Brahman and the British and break the chains of caste and poverty. The dangers he saw for India were structural, not spiritual. As he wrote in 1939: "It does not need a defeatist to feel deeply anxious about the future of millions who, with all their innate culture and their peaceful traditions, are being simultaneously subjected to hunger, disease, exploitations foreign and indigenous, and the seething discontents of communalism."

Sen's reflections on Tagore, however, would have benefited from comparison with another great Indian poet: Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who wrote in Urdu and Persian. Iqbal, too, was given to mysticism, but of the Sufi variety. Younger than Tagore, he was greatly influenced by Hegel and the German philosophical tradition and was a great favorite of both Nehru and Jinnah. Iqbal, too, died before partition. Tragically, he was immediately mummified by the new state of Pakistan, his message so distorted that he is seen by many in that country as a revivalist, which is far from the truth. Like Tagore, he loathed priest and mullah alike and celebrated reason and knowledge, as in this verse dividing God from Man:


You created Night, I the Lamp
You the earth, I the bowls
You created wilderness, mountains and ravines
I the flower beds, gardens and groves
I make mirrors from stone
I find antidotes in poison.

Both Tagore and Iqbal would have been mortified at the direction taken by the modern leaders of the old subcontinent. Like Sen, both would have been alarmed by the nuclear turn and missiles with confessional names targeted by each side against the other. Even those who disagree with Sen or see him as a tame and toothless Bengal tiger will be compelled to engage with his arguments. That alone is sufficient reason to welcome the publication of this book.

American volunteers touched by Pakistan's hospitality

Daily Times, Thursday, November 24, 2005
American volunteers touched by Pakistan’s beauty and hospitality
By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: An American woman doctor who thought of Pakistan as a dangerous place is now reluctant to leave because of the “beauty and hospitality” she has experienced.

Dr Mary Burry, an American, now in Pakistan for earthquake relief, told Christian Science Monitor, “Like most Americans, I had the idea that this is a pretty dangerous place to be,” she says, adding that she had never known any Pakistanis. What she discovered, however, is a country whose beauty and hospitality she is now reluctant to leave. “This totally changed my concept of Pakistan.” One of her Pakistani colleagues, Dr Rezwana Ahsan, working with Mercy Corps, a relief organisation, who has never known any Americans, feels the same way, “We had a feeling before that Americans are selfish and too proud. But they are not so. They came here with an open mind and an open heart.” The two doctors and their teams are working in Battal, Azad Kashmir. US volunteers throughout Pakistan say that, despite initial concerns, relief work has fostered a welcome forum of exchange with Pakistanis, helping to dispel misconceptions held on both sides.

According to the report published on Wednesday, “No one knows exactly how many Americans are volunteering in the earthquake relief, since neither the US Embassy nor Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry is keeping track. But their presence is widely felt throughout the affected areas, from tent hospitals like Dr Burry’s, to mountainside villages where volunteers are building shelters before the winter arrives.”

The report admits that while Pakistan has been an old ally of the United States, Americans often hear more about the trouble spots in the relationship, including nuclear proliferation by Pakistani scientists and the possibility that top Al Qaeda members like Osama Bin Laden may be hiding in Pakistan. For their part, many Pakistanis harbour grievances common in the Muslim world about US foreign policy. Pakistani officials hope the goodwill wrought by the tragedy can bring the two nations closer together, the report adds.

Tasnim Aslam, spokeswoman for the Foreign Office, told the newspaper, “This tragedy has helped on both sides because people in Pakistan have had some misconceptions, but they’ve been greatly touched by Americans. And the Americans who have come here and worked side by side with Pakistanis, their attitude must have undergone a change as well.”

Some volunteers are working free, while others have gone “beyond the normal call of duty”. What they share in common, after working alongside Pakistanis, is a “newfound appreciation for a country they never knew and therefore deeply misunderstood. Many say they don’t want to leave anytime soon; most hope to come back.” Many Americans now working in the quake-hit areas are seasoned volunteers sent by organised missions. Dr Burry, for instance, is a neuroradiologist who came through North West Medical Teams and Mercy Corps, both based in Portland, Oregon. She decided long ago, after witnessing the ravages of famine in Somalia, that this would be her calling. Other Americans have come on their own, with no volunteer experience, only a wish to apply whatever skills they can in these hours of need.

Another American volunteer, Wesley Olson from Los Angeles, was travelling around the world and had applied for a visa to Pakistan the day before the quake struck. “I decided if they gave me a visa, I’d go and volunteer,” he told the newspaper, adding that he’d never volunteered before. The visa eventually came through, and Olson has spent the last three weeks building shelters up in the mountain town of Surul, with a team including Pakistani doctors and volunteers from New Zealand, Australia, and India. He says he lives off his savings, paying when necessary for food and transportation. But it’s all money well spent. “We’re going around taking from these countries as tourists. And now it’s time to give back in their hour of need.”

Olson said that misconceptions were a common topic of conversation among his team. But like him, they’ve all come to think of Pakistan as a place they love. “All we hear about in the Western media is that Afghanistan is nearby, Al Qaeda is here. I don’t want to say I had a negative concept, but I didn’t know what to think.” Now he lauds Pakistan as one of the highlights of his travels. “I’ve been to eight or nine countries by now - and by far the nicest people I’ve met have been here,” he says.

Ahmed Nawaz, a villager in Balakot, said, “There were some people, for political reasons, who had the wrong impression about Americans. But the people have seen you working with them in their hour of need and there is a great change in perception.”

Some Americans, however, are more cautious, says the report. “I suspect this is a honeymoon period that may pass,” according to Dr Luke Cutherell, the chief executive officer of Bach Christian Hospital in Qalandarabad, founded 50 years ago by a US missionary group. Dr Cutherell, although American, was born in Pakistan, and has dedicated most of his life to working here. When the quake struck, he and other doctors, including eight Americans, went to 12-hour shifts, providing free treatment, medicine, and food for the patients. Cutherell, who lost close friends in the earthquake, knows well that violent animosity toward Americans is limited to fringe groups in Pakistan. But those fringe elements also attacked a nearby Christian school for foreigners in 2002, killing six Pakistani employees. “It will take more than one period of goodwill to erase the deep animosity that some people have.”

However, Dr Burry hopes that efforts like hers can help erase that animosity one interaction at a time. “We always evaluate every programme: Do we really want to send the next team?” She says the possibility to change perceptions on both sides alone would be worth it. “The more people who meet, the better it is,” she says. “I want to come back in the winter.”

Sunday, November 20, 2005

Osama Evaded Pakistan Army - yet again!

Daily Times, Monday, November 21, 2005
‘Osama evaded Pakistani troops’

LONDON: Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden evaded capture by just 30 minutes as Pakistani troops zeroed in on him in a remote village close to the Afghan border earlier this year, reported the Press Trust of India, quoting the British tabloid ‘News of the World’ on Sunday.

The tabloid claimed that data from a cellular phone used by one of Bin Laden’s close aides helped Pakistani troops pinpoint his hideout. But by the time they raided the area Bin Laden had slipped away, it added.

According to PTI, details of the operation were revealed to American interviewer Daphne Barak by President Pervez Musharraf. “It was in the spring. We acted on intelligence reports and were close. Such fleeting opportunities come and either you succeed in a moment or you fail and miss the opportunity for a long time,” the British paper quoted Musharraf as saying in Islamabad. The Pakistani embassy in London confirmed the report this week. “We think we missed Bin Laden by 30 minutes. It was the closest we have been since 2001.” daily times monitor

Brave Imam!

Daily Times, Monday, November 21, 2005
Imam faces expulsion over charges of sectarianism
By Mohammad Imran

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF) station commander in Wah Cantt issued a show cause notice to Maulana Qazi Zafar, the prayer leader at Jamia Mosque in East Park, for allegedly fanning sectarianism and hatred against the government and the armed forces among residents during Friday sermons. The maulana denied the charges saying public criticism should not be construed as propaganda.

The notice signed by Station Commander Hafiz Muhammad Shafiq states, “You, Maulana Qazi Zafar, D-810, Lane No 19, Lala Rukh, Wah Cantt, are reportedly spreading sectarianism and hatred against the government and the armed forces among army personnel and POF employees during Friday sermons in Jamia Mosque, East Park”. The commander accused the maulana of creating disloyalty, disaffection and breach of peace in Wah Cantt.

The station commander, in the notice, warned the maulana that the latter was liable to be expelled from Wah Cantonment within 24 hours under section 239 of the Cantonment Act, 1924, and sought a reply, failing which will lead to an ex-parte action. “You should be removed from Wah Cantonment within 24 hours and debarred from entering the cantonment area,” the notice states.

In reply to the notice, Maulana Zafar said the whole state was sacred like a mosque and stopping the preaching of Islam was a great sin. “All institutions, including the judiciary, armed forces, parliament and rulers are answerable to God,” he said. “I am not fanning sectarianism and feelings of hatred against the armed forces because I believe that the Pakistan Army is an asset to the country and the Muslim ummah but if any general topples an elected government, breaks his commitment to the people and adopts a political role, then criticism should not be taken as propaganda against the armed forces,” he said.

As a prayer leader, it is my responsibility to tell people the truth whether even if it is hard, he said, adding that Wah Cantt was his hometown and nobody had any right to expel him from the city.

Friday, November 18, 2005

The Madrassa Controversy...

Daily Times, November 19, 2005
COMMENT: The madrassa controversy and dilemma —William B Milam

For a government that hopes (it says) to guide Pakistan towards “enlightened moderation,” as well as to ensure that Pakistan and its people prosper in the globalised world economy, reforming the curriculum and teaching methods in the madrassas is not an option; it is an imperative

The daily press, both in the US and in Pakistan, brings an unending string of sad and tragic stories about the earthquake and its aftermath. From here in Washington, one can only sympathise with the victims — indeed with all of Pakistan — and try to help through various charities. To get a respite from the inexorable tide of those grim events, I turn to my favourite bi-weekly (as distinct from daily publications like Daily Times), The New York Review of Books, the most recent edition of which arrived by mail at my new abode a few days ago.

I moved residence a few months ago which meant that I missed a few editions of this publication. However, in the latest edition — December 1, 2005 — the first article I came across was called “Inside Madrassas” by William Dalrymple. It is an excellent article, though it did not cheer me up.

Although Dalrymple mentions, here and there in the article, madrassas in other Muslim countries, the focus is Pakistan’s madrassas. Pakistan, according to Dalrymple, is in the unenviable position of being the Islamic country in which madrassas are numerous and dominant in the educational structure. One might say that it is a role model — though this is not a role that should be coveted by leaders whose policy aim is “enlightened moderation.”

Though I have done a bit of research on Pakistan’s madrassas for the book I am writing, I do not consider myself an expert on them. In my non-expert view, Dalrymple’s article seems quite objective and balanced. He makes a number of points that Pakistanis and the friends of Pakistan in the West will find unexceptionable, though worrisome. For example the strength and dominance of the madrassas in the Pakistani educational system; and their counterpoint, the virtual collapse of public education in Pakistan which makes madrassas one of the two alternatives for schooling. He doesn’t mention the other alternative, private schools, which may not be an alternative for the poor. He recites the dismal literacy and school attendance figures.

None of this will surprise Western readers, or provoke much controversy among those who know Pakistan. What may prove more surprising to Westerners is Dalrymple’s discussion of the relationship between madrassas and the global terrorism network of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda look-alikes. He largely discounts the links between madrassas to that noxious movement. On the “intellectually shaky theory” that madrassas are “little more than Al Qaeda training schools”, he pours copious quantities of cold water. (The quotes are from the article.)

He points out that many Pakistani madrassas reflect hard-line Islamic thought that evolved in the South Asian Subcontinent in reaction to the British deposition of the last Mughal Emperor in 1858. Madrassas reflecting that stripped-down and narrowly scriptural strain of Islam have spread in the last 50 years, and particularly since 1980, with the help of Ziaul Haq and the Saudis. The curriculum of many of these madrassas emphasises rote learning. Geometry from Euclid and medicine from Galen is taught, as if there have been no advances in these disciplines in two millennia. Some of these madrassas even continue to stand by the Ptolemaic universe.

Madrassa graduates, for the most part, leave school with a focus on fostering proper Islamic behaviour at home but few technical skills for making them employable in the modern, globalised world or useable by modern terrorist organisations — that have carried out the highly sophisticated attacks on Western targets such as the Twin Towers, the Madrid train station, the London Underground, US embassies in Africa, and the USS Cole. Almost all the perpetrators of these horrific acts came from secular backgrounds and had received modern (and often Western) technical training.

Dalrymple does not exculpate madrassas from direct links to Islamic radicalism or from the different kinds of social pathologies it fosters. There are madrassas (about 15 percent, he says) which preach violent jihad, some which support civil violence (such as the sectarian conflicts that bedevil Pakistan), and some that churn out soldiers for the jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

He misses — or perhaps does not emphasise — one important point, however. Pakistanis, and Pakistan’s friends, should not heave a large sigh of relief because Pakistan’s madrassas are not directly connected to Al Qaeda’s terrorism. Their dominance is still inimical to Pakistan’s best interests. As Dalrymple writes, “Few [madrassas] make any effort to prepare their students to function in a modern, plural society.”

Apart from the economic and social consequences of this crippling deficiency — uncompetitive economy, radicalised religious belief, growing intolerance — the political consequences are increasingly clear, and the Islamist parties are not shy in publicising the political benefits that they see accruing to them. “[T]he political transformation our madrassas are bringing about is having a massive effect on the future of Pakistan,” is the way one Islamist party spokesman put it to Dalrymple.

There are madrassas that are more modern in their curricula and their teaching methods. But they are a tiny minority. They should be role models for the rest, but there is little sign from afar that the government has the nerve or the footing to tackle madrassa reform seriously. Not only is it now on the defensive for its laggard and feeble response to the earthquake, but the contrast with the rapid and efficient response of jihadi organisations has put it at even more of a disadvantage vis-Ć -vis the madrassas.

That is the dilemma. The madrassas are the only alternative for education of the poor because Pakistani governments for 58 years have failed in their obligation to provide education to the Pakistani people. Until and unless the public education system is restored, the madrassas are the only alternative.

Yet restoring the education system — which is in a shambles — will take a generation, at least. Therefore, for a government that hopes (it says) to guide Pakistan towards “enlightened moderation,” as well as to ensure that Pakistan and its people prosper in the globalised world economy, reforming the curriculum and teaching methods in the madrassas is not an option; it is an imperative.

William Milam is a former US ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC

Why Not Women Ulema?

The News, November 19, 2005
Why not women ulema?
Hafizur Rahman

When Malik Meraj Khalid was the caretaker prime minister, he selected the old President's House in Rawalpindi as the location for a new Islamic University for Women. He went so far as to actually transfer the building and its vast grounds to the International Islamic University of Islamabad (IIU) and on return to his post of rector of the IIU, started planning accordingly. But the new prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, revoked his decision and decided to use the place for what is now the Fatima Jinnah Women University.

This was a disappointment for the authorities of the IIU whose vision had reached the point of materialising, but there was nothing they could do about it. So they began to devote their energies towards improving the conditions of teaching and boarding and lodging for women students in the Madinatul Hujjaj on Peshawar Road which had earlier been secured for them in place of the scattered bungalows in Islamabad.

I am always asking people, "Why don't we have women ulema?" The answer is invariably unsatisfactory. My sister, when she was in Punjab University, once had to sit with a highly qualified teacher of Islamiat to go over a syllabus. She was horrified to find him selective in his approach to tenets that dealt with the rights and privileges of women. When she objected that he was playing with almost divine dictates, he said, "Our women need not know everything. It will spoil them for their roles as wives and mothers."

This was in Islamabad. In the same city, the Islamic University has hundreds of women students who can take up subjects like usuluddin (Islamic Studies), fiqh, shariah and economics, to which were later added business administration, computer science, and English language and literature. It never occurred to the IIU bosses to be similarly selective in teaching these subjects to wives and mothers.

Since the IIU, from its very inception in 1985, had functioned in the Faisal Mosque complex, it had not been possible to accommodate women students for sheer want of space. There was barely room in the complex for any kind of activity except conducting classes, while its various academies and institutes were packed like sardines in the limited area allotted to them, let alone its magnificent library and the printing press.

Later work started in real earnest on the buildings at the new site comprising the entire H-10 sector, and the university was in a position to spread and begin new disciplines like engineering and medicine and others that it had always wanted to offer. An academic block and hostels for women students were on the list of priorities.

Coming back to my question, it seems that the absence of females among scholars and interpreters of the Quran and Sunnah is not confined to Pakistan; it prevails generally all over the Muslim world. Maybe that is why the government has always found it a problem to nominate a woman member to the Council of Islamic Ideology. Somehow religious scholarship is a purely male preserve, as if faith is not a woman's concern at all, whereas Islam makes no distinction in this regard between men and women. Why is this so?

The answer could be that in order to maintain their domination, Muslim men have purposely kept women away from the deeper study of religion. It is as if they were saying (like that Islamiat teacher) to their female relations, "Leave this matter to us. We'll tell you what is relevant to you in the Holy Book. You go and cook the dinner." Purdah too has contributed much to this state of affairs.

The situation boils down to the fact that we in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan can have a woman prime minister to govern the destiny of 130 million Muslims. But we will not countenance a woman acquiring the distinction of being a venerated and trusted scholar of Islam and whose views can be treated with respect.

It comes as a pleasant surprise to most people that there are nearly eight hundred women students in the International Islamic University. A still greater surprise is that almost half of this number are from thirty foreign countries. How brave of them to come to a strange land in their love for Islamic learning. Pakistan certainly inspires confidence and trust outside, and this is one big contribution of the IIU to the country's image in the Muslim world.

The case of the Islamic University in the matter of women students' devotion to studies is rather different from that of other colleges and seats of learning. These girls do not come here for the sole purpose of getting degrees but to acquire Islamic education about which they are serious and intelligent seekers. And maybe they are determined to break the monopoly of men in religious knowledge.

If an institution had noble objectives they will apply equally to all students, whether men or women, local or foreign. The aim of the IIU is to integrate modern knowledge with Islamic principles and to turn out enlightened Muslims who will be a pride to the faith. Women deserve this enlightenment as much as men.

By the way, the IIU has certain other characteristics too. It is the only university in Pakistan to maintain discipline in its affairs, in that it holds all its academic activities, including admissions and examinations, right on time. Women too need much discipline, or at least the sense of it, which is otherwise lacking in our social and family lives. And yet girl students turned out in large numbers some years ago against PPP Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar's uncalled for remarks about the IIU's alleged involvement in terrorism.

The presence of women students in the IIU is a tribute to the belief that in Islam religious education is as much enjoined on women as on men. It is not something esoteric; it is part of a Muslim's life. Without it, his or her life is not complete. We talk every day of women going into all kinds of professions -- from high court judges to airline pilots -- but somehow we balk at women becoming reliable scholars of Islam. Let us see if the IIU is able to produce women ulema for Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

Thursday, November 17, 2005

Reconciliation with Taliban and Al-Qaeda??

Daily Times, Friday, November 18, 2005

Paracha claims US asked him to help it ‘reconcile’ with Qaeda, Taliban
By Iqbal Khattak

PESHAWAR: The United States has asked Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Javed Ibrahim Paracha to facilitate a ‘reconciliation’ with Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

Paracha, a former MNA from Kohat district, claimed on Thursday that was invited to a meeting with visiting US Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs Karen Hughes and other senior US State Department officials at Serena Hotel in Islamabad on November 14.

“I met Ms Hughes,” he told Daily Times by phone from Kohat. He claimed that the US officials had requested him ‘to help them negotiate a reconciliation with Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders’ in Afghanistan. “We would like you to support the US government on the issue,” he said.

However, the US Embassy spokesman in Islamabad denied Ms Hughes had met Paracha.

“I know she stayed at Serena Hotel, but when I checked her schedule, there was no encounter with any local politician,” Peter Kovach told Daily Times by phone from Islamabad. “Nobody recalls such a meeting with a local politician,” he added.

Paracha said the US diplomats told him that they had met former ISI chiefs Gen Ehsanul Haq and Gen Hamid Gul, who had referred them (US diplomats) to him (Paracha) to start negotiations with the Taliban.

Paracha said he met Peshawar Corps Commander Lt Gen Muhammad Hamid Khan in a follow-up meeting later on Thursday. “I also met the Peshawar corps commander on Thursday, but will not share any details of both meetings at the moment,” he added. Paracha made headlines when he secured the release of hundreds of detained Arabs through the Peshawar High Court after their arrest in late 2001 on terrorism charges.

The federal government accused him of harbouring terrorists, but did not charge him with any offence for his “close association” with Al Qaeda and Taliban elements in Pakistan.

Paracha said US and Pakistani intelligence personnel had met him in the Peshawar High Court on the morning of November 14 and invited him to meet US diplomats in Islamabad. “I drove to Islamabad for the meeting,” he added.

“Besides US officials, former Taliban leaders and Afghan politicians were also present at Serena Hotel and they sought my help to play a role to convince the Taliban to give up terrorist activities and accept the Afghan government’s reconciliation offer,” Paracha said.

The PML-N leader refused to identify the Taliban leaders or Afghan politicians at the meeting.

“The US officials and Afghan leaders asked me to convince the remaining Taliban leaders to cooperate with the US for a stable Afghanistan,” Paracha added.

Tuesday, November 15, 2005

Blinded by the Bomb

HIMAL South Asian November-December, 2005

Blinded by the Bomb by | Zia Mian

Against all civilisational values, Islamabad and New Delhi proceed to prepare their bombs and missiles – for nuclear war to be fought on our soil.
For decades, leaders of India and Pakistan have been bewitched by the power of the bomb. Regardless of their various other differences, they seem to have believed that the threat of massive destruction represented by nuclear weapons is a force for good, and that the weapons themselves are vital to the well-being of their respective countries. President A P J Abdul Kalam, for instance, has claimed that nuclear weapons are “truly weapons of peace”. For his part, President Pervez Musharraf has declared that his country’s nuclear weapons are as critical and important as national security, the economy and Kashmir.

For those not blinded by the Bomb, however, the pursuit of nuclear weapons has brought nothing but a competition in destructive capabilities and crisis after crisis. The Cold War seemed proof enough, but the lessons have been lost to those who rule in India and Pakistan. New Delhi’s nuclear ambitions have served only to encourage Islamabad to follow blindly. The 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran sharpened Pakistan’s determination not to be left behind and, as many had feared, the bomb was not willing to be left in the shadows for long. First India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998.

Things went from bad to worse. The Kargil War followed barely a year afterwards, proving that two nuclear armed countries could indeed fight wars – contrary to the suggestions of some. Many hundreds of soldiers died on each side, as the leadership in the two countries threatened apocalypse. A little over two years later, India and Pakistan prepared to fight again. An estimated half-million troops were rushed to the border and, as days turned into weeks and months, nuclear threats were made with abandon. What lessons were learned from the extended standoff at the border? None, it seems – other than perhaps that each country needed to be better prepared to fight a nuclear war.

In 2005, both countries carried out major war games that assumed the possible use of nuclear weapons. An India-Pakistan nuclear war, in which each used only five of their available nuclear weapons, would kill an estimated three million people and severely injure another one-and-a-half million. Meanwhile, even as Southasian and world public opinion press both countries to step back from the nuclear brink, New Delhi and Islamabad respond with efforts to portray themselves as ‘responsible’ nuclear states. At the same time, they continue to push forward as hard as possible with their arms race.

The abyss between words and deeds was clear from the first public show of nuclear responsibility – the 1999 Lahore summit between prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Mian Nawaz Sharif. Even though the two men had ordered their nuclear establishments to undertake tests barely a year earlier, in Lahore they discussed “sharing a vision of peace and stability” and “progress and prosperity” for their peoples. The summit produced little in the way of tangible progress on controlling the nuclear arms race. The two states did agree to inform each other about ballistic missile tests, but it was only in October 2005 that they finally followed through on that agreement. Even so, the accord does nothing to limit the future development or testing of missiles.

War games
The Subcontinent is in the middle of a missile race. Both India and Pakistan have tested various types of missiles in recent years, even taking initial steps towards the deployment of nuclear-armed missiles. India has introduced the 2000 km-range Agni-II missile into its arsenal. Pakistan has done the same with the 750 km Shaheen missile, as well as having tested the 1500 km Ghauri. These missiles would need as little as five minutes of flight time to reach important cities in the ‘opposing’ countries.

Just as happened during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, in Southasia the development of these missiles has triggered a frantic search for a defence shield, as well as a counter to such a defence. India has sought ballistic missile defences from Russia, Israel and the US to neutralise Pakistan’s missiles. Pakistan has responded by testing a 500 km-range ground-launched cruise missile, which General Musharraf linked to concerns about Indian plans: “There was a feeling that there was an imbalance, which is being created because of the purchase of very advanced-technology weapons ... Let me say this improves the balance.”

The quest for advantage triggers the quest for balance and on it goes. It is no surprise that military budgets in both India and Pakistan have spiralled since the nuclear tests began. India spent over INR 2.2 trillion on its military between 2000 and 2004. Gen Musharraf has revealed that Pakistan has spent more since 2000 on its nuclear arsenal than it had in the previous 30 years.

The future looks worse. In June 2005, the US and India signed a 10-year defence-cooperation agreement, which involves the sale of advanced weapons and assistance to both India’s space and nuclear programmes. As a senior US official explained: “[Our] goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century,” adding, “We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement.” The agreement’s purpose was made clear when former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, asked, “Why should the US want to check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?”

The June decision was followed in July with a more explicit nuclear deal, in which the Bush administration agreed to overturn US and international regulations that have for decades restricted India’s access to uranium, the raw material for both nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons. For its part, India will separate its military and civil nuclear facilities and programmes and will volunteer its civil facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US has not asked India to halt the production of nuclear weapons material as part of the deal; India is unlikely to do so. Access to the international uranium market would allow India to free up more of its domestic uranium for a significant expansion of its nuclear weapons capabilities. India’s options could, for example, include building a third nuclear reactor to make plutonium for more weapons; beginning to make highly-enriched uranium for weapons; or making fuel for the nuclear submarine it has been trying to build for decades.

Pakistan has now asked for the same deal from the United States. Former army chief Jahangir Karamat, now ambassador to the US, has warned: “The balance of power in Southasia should not become so tilted in India’s favour, as a result of the US relationship with India, that Pakistan has to start taking extraordinary measures to ensure a capability for deterrence and defence.” The US has refused Islamabad’s request, citing, among other things, Pakistan’s role in spreading nuclear weapons technologies to North Korea, Libya and Iran, and its refusal to come clean on the A Q Khan affair. Despite all the talk of a ‘minimum deterrent’, Pakistan may now seek to prepare for an expansion of its own programme. A former Pakistani foreign secretary has even argued that Islamabad “should refine its deterrent capability by stepping up research and development and by integrating strategic assets on land, air and sea – though even that project would be costly and take years.”

Time of madmen
The increasingly powerful nuclear weapons complex in both India and Pakistan is overwhelming good sense and derailing the possibility of peace. On both sides, with similarly narrow goals, nuclear weapons proponents are driving the Subcontinent ever faster down the path toward bigger and more dangerous nuclear arsenals and war. The time has come for us to echo the words of the American sociologist Lewis Mumford, writing soon after the dawn of the nuclear age: “Madmen govern our affairs in the name of order and security. The chief madmen claim the titles of general, admiral, senator, scientist, administrator, Secretary of State, even President.”

If Southasia is to survive its own nuclear age, we will need strong peace movements in both Pakistan and India, as well as throughout the rest of Southasia. The first steps have already been taken. The Pakistan Peace Coalition, founded in 1999, is a national network of groups working for peace and justice. On the other side of the border, Indian activists in 2000 established the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace. These movements will need all the help and support that they can get to keep the generals, presidents and prime ministers in check. Leaders in India and Pakistan must be firmly told that the people will not allow a nuclear war to be fought.

Sunday, November 13, 2005

Madrassahs of Pakistan: A study

An excellent report on Madrassahs of Pakistan by Saleem H. Ali (University of Vermont, USA):
Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the MAdrassahs of Pakistan
http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/Ali-Madrassah-draft-8-15-05.pdf
or
http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah.html

Another aspect of the Mukhtaran Mai case

Daily Times, Monday, November 14, 2005

VIEW: A Maulvi that mattered —Saleem H Ali

Instead of championing a progressive imam such as Maulvi Abdul Razzaq, the secular elite of Pakistan remained quiet. Instead of being applauded, the imam was accused by the village police of being a terrorist — to discredit his support for Mukhtar Mai

Last week in New York’s Lincoln Centre, Glamour magazine gave an award to Mukhtar Mai who valiantly fought against an evil cultural practice and won the hearts of millions. Mukhtar Mai was rightly heralded as Pakistan’s Rosa Parks as she received the award.

Mukhtar Mai lived much of her life in a remote rural part of Punjab and speaks no English. Yet the world recognised her suffering. Her tragic tale of gang-rape on the orders of a village council or panchayat has alarmed human rights activists, journalists and greatly embarrassed the government of Pakistan. Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times brought this important story to the world’s attention but in a recent interview he remarked with humility that his role was simply that of a “sherpa” while Mukhtar Mai was the real mountaineer who climbed on against all odds.

Much as Mukhtar Mai deserves to be congratulated for her courage, there is another unsung hero in this saga. In a patriarchal and highly restricted society such as rural Pakistan, one may wonder how Mukhtar Mai was able to get her voice heard and approach the police. Initially she was so desperate and humiliated that she swallowed a bottle of pesticide, hoping for a merciful death but was saved in time. Her cries for help initially went unheard by urban women’s rights groups but a local mosque’s imam paid heed.

Defying the stereotype of a misogynistic Muslim male Maulvi, Abdul Razzaq stood by Mukhtar Mai. He gave a sermon at the Friday prayers saying that the village council had sinned greatly and that the criminals responsible for rape must be brought to justice. He then went beyond his pulpit and brought a local journalist, Mureed Abbas, to meet Mukhtar Mai’s father, and persuaded the family to file charges. The family was persuaded to do so primarily because of the imam’s stature in the community.

At this point Pakistan’s excellent assemblage of women’s rights activists embraced Mukhtar Mai and helped her through the convoluted judicial process. However, women’s rights activists have tried to distance themselves from the Muslim connection in the case. An opportunity for positive interaction between the religious right and the feminists was regrettably passed.

As I researched for this article, I asked Asma Jahangir via email about the potential for joining forces with Islamists in this case. She responded that her organisation could neither confirm nor deny the help that Maulvi Abdul Razzaq had provided. However, all correspondent accounts including the BBC’s and Mukhtar Mai’s statements confirm his help.

As the judicial process unfolded, those responsible for this crime were charged but in March 2005, the Lahore High Court overturned the conviction for lack of “convincing evidence”. At this point there was a positive intervention by the religious establishment. The Federal Shariat Court intervened and ordered that the criminals be apprehended again. This was remarkable since Islamic courts generally favour men in cases of rape and adultery. Indeed, there are many cases of women being accused of adultery after they have actually been raped.

In this case, both the Islamic courts as well as the clergy have played a positive role for which they should be commended. Of course, we must be cautious that such commendation does not condone the incidents of hostility towards women by the religious establishment. Eventually, the Supreme Court of Pakistan intervened and took jurisdiction over the case and the role of religious elements received little press coverage.

As President Pervez Musharraf tries to paint the image of Pakistan as a progressive Muslim state, not highlighting the positive role played by the clergy in this high-profile case was a missed opportunity. Instead, the president engaged in defensive rhetoric and rows with the Washington Post over an interview in which he claimed that rape victims were easily getting visas for abroad.

The “rape to riches” theory became the focus of this sad story when the positive role of the imam who championed Mukhtar Mai’s cause and the Islamic court that supported her were ignored. To his credit, the president gave Mukhtar Mai Rs 500,000 ($8,000) to start a school in her village as compensation but the greater message was one of denial.

Much as I support our human rights activists, it is surprising that neither they nor foreign governments or the Pakistani government were keen to give credit where it is due. Instead of championing a progressive imam such as Maulvi Abdul Razzaq, the secular elite of Pakistan remained quiet. Instead of being applauded, the imam was accused by the village police of being a terrorist — to discredit his support for Mukhtar Mai.

When such positive actions go unappreciated cynicism sets in among reformers. Acknowledging the efforts of this cleric is exceedingly important. It is also high time secular and religious forces try to find common ground on human rights issues. Let us be principled and not positional in our approach. As we congratulate Mukhtar Mai for her efforts, we must consider the role of a progressive imam as a rare but promising sign that Islam might also be a means of championing women’s rights.

Saleem H Ali teaches conflict resolution and environmental planning at the University of Vermont and is the author of a study on Pakistan’s religious schools for the United States Institute of Peace