Friday, July 29, 2005

US-India nuclear diplomacy

Daily Times, July 29, 2005
CONTROVERSY:Bush starts to get it right on India’s nuclear status - Jonathan Power

The new policy has all the advantages of jettisoning hypocrisy. The next step, which logically should grow from it, would be to revise the Non-Proliferation Treaty to make India formally one of the established nuclear powers, and thus gain India’s membership of the Treaty

The critics of President George W Bush’s new nuclear deal with India have got it back to front. They appear to have no understanding of the history of US-Indian nuclear relations. They draw their pessimistic and sanctimonious conclusions about how this new policy of relaxing the supply of advanced nuclear materials to India will further undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as if no water had ever flowed under the bridge.

Let’s go back to the head of that river.

The first mistake in dealing with India was for President Richard Nixon to make it unambiguously clear in the early days of his opening-to-China policy that a major reason for taking China seriously was China’s possession of the bomb. The second mistake was the famous Nixon-Kissinger “tilt” towards Pakistan during the India-Pakistan war of 1971. It was at that time that the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, gave the go ahead to India’s scientists to develop a nuclear device. The third mistake was to say nothing, yes nothing, when India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974. In the West only the UK and Canada made a public criticism.

Then under the earnest, but simplistic, non-proliferation, diplomacy of President Jimmy Carter, a once in a lifetime opportunity to neutralise India’s still fledgling pro-bomb policy was missed. The issue was whether, in the light of India’s ongoing secret nuclear research, the US should continue to supply enriched uranium to India’s reactor in Tarapur. Washington announced it would not do so any longer, unless India signed a safeguard agreement on the use of spent fuel. But at the same time, in a sharp contradiction, Washington was refusing to criticise France even though Paris was attempting to sell nuclear reactors to China, which was then not only a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but a fully armed nuclear weapons power as well.

What should the US have done? Carter was negotiating with the most pacific prime minister India has ever had, Morarji Desai, a convinced Gandhian. Carter should have made his first approach to India before the restrictively worded 1987 Non-Proliferation Act landed on his desk. He should have told Desai that the US understood, given previous American attitudes, why it was an Indian point of principle not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Because it was both discriminatory and hypocritical, with its unfulfilled pledge for the already nuclear armed powers to reduce their stockpiles in return for the have-nots not entering the nuclear arms business.)

Carter should have also made it clear that the question of supplies of enriched uranium to Tarapur was not an issue since the Indian government, at that moment, had no intention of building nuclear weapons. (Ironically, 25 years later, US and EU policy towards Iran is to offer it enriched uranium if it forswears the nuclear bomb option.)

If this approach had been coupled with more rapid US progress on strategic nuclear arms reductions with the Soviet Union and adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Desai might have been swung over. He would have had the political muscle to do what he really wanted to do — which was to override New Delhi’s nuclear lobby once and for all. Desai then might not only have committed his country to a policy of international inspection but he may well have been prepared to make a formal promise to forgo nuclear weapons. (Although later, as an extra incentive, the US would also have had to forgo its post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan policy of turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear bomb research.)

But Carter, unable to make the intellectual leap and also feeling his hands were tied by a hard line Congress, persisted with the policy of sanctioning India’s nuclear industry. The blunderbuss triumphed over a more sophisticated diplomacy. Unsurprisingly, not only did a proud India go its own way into nuclear self-sufficiency, it was finally to end up in the hands of the nuclear hawks of the right wing Hindu-nationalist government which decided in 1998 to unveil India’s nuclear bomb.

India was lost on the issue seven years ago. Bush is merely recognising the obvious, which his predecessor had refused to do. The new policy has all the advantages of jettisoning hypocrisy. The next step, which logically should grow from it, would be to revise the Non-Proliferation Treaty to make India formally one of the established nuclear powers, and thus gain India’s membership of the Treaty. Then India’s immense diplomatic energies could be harnessed to the battle of ensuring that other countries are not pushed towards the bomb by the double standards of the nuclear-haves.

The writer is a leading columnist on international affairs, human rights and peace issues. He syndicates his columns with some 50 papers around the world

Yet another great game in Central Asia!

Daily Times, July 29, 2005
VIEW: Great Game reloaded - Ahmed Rashid

Maintenance of the US bases and political influence will now require closer and constant attention. The Great Game that once preoccupied Czarist Russia and the British Empire has just been revived, and the stakes are higher than ever

In a major twist to the continuing Great Game on Central Asia’s landmass, Russia and China are attempting to reclaim the dominant role in the region that they ceded to the US in the aftermath of 9/11. Though their ham-handed attempt to expel American bases from the region has been foiled for the moment, the jockeying for power, influence and resources in this neuralgic region, put on hold until now, is back in full force. If they can deftly play one against the other, small countries in the region may well be the beneficiaries in the latest phase of the Great Game.

The latest act of the game was played out in the open when US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld flew into Bishkek on July 25 to foil the Russian-Chinese attempt. Kyrgyz Defence Minister Ismail Isakov, standing with Rumsfeld, assured him that the Americans would not leave in a hurry. “The presence of the US base depends entirely on the situation in Afghanistan,” Isakov said and added: “Today the secretary (Rumsfeld) noted that the situation in Afghanistan is not back to normal.”

The first move in the game of diplomatic chess came on July 5 when Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, while meeting with the four Central Asian Republics at a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Astana, Kazakhstan, made an unprecedented demand for the withdrawal of US troops from the region. The SCO statement said that as stability returns to Afghanistan, foreign troops are no longer needed in Central Asia.

“As the active military phase in the anti-terror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion”, the statement said, it was time “to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingent’s presence” in member countries. The July 5 demands – first of their kind by the SCO — reconfigure the organisation as a major alliance in the Central Asian region, firmly in the hands of Russia and China and a major challenger to NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in Central Asia.

In subsequent statements by Moscow designed to pressure the Central Asian states to act quickly, it was evident that in order to drive the Americans out of Central Asia Russia was prepared to live with the threats still emanating from Afghanistan. China, which has always been apprehensive of US troops based close to its borders, was keen to voice its demands through an international organisation, rather than pick an individual fight with the US.

However, the SCO demand rested on the flimsy grounds that Afghanistan was secure, which contradicted Russia’s lamentations of the failure of President Hamid Karzai and US forces to stabilise the situation there and the assertion that the Afghans were giving sanctuary to Islamic extremists accused of stirring up trouble in Uzbekistan and Chechnya. Between March 1 and July 25, 700 people were killed due to Taliban resurgence as the country prepared to hold parliamentary elections on September 18.

The US has rebuffed the SCO demand and said it would hold talks with each individual state. Rumsfeld’s Bishkek meeting was the first. In the aftermath of 9/11 the US established two major bases in the region: the first at Karshi-Khanabad, or K2, in southern Uzbekistan, and the other at Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek. Both have serviced US troops and aircraft in Afghanistan. Presently 800 US troops are stationed in Uzbekistan and 1,000 in Kyrgyzstan. France and NATO set up air bases in Tajikistan at Dushanbe and Kuliob in the south. Russia has military and air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but there is no SCO demand for their withdrawal.

The Pentagon maintains that these bases are important for its Afghan operation. But they are also critical to wider US ambitions in the region. Further goals include controlling oil supplies from the Caspian Basin – especially now that a Western pipeline transporting oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to the Mediterranean via Turkey is in operation – and Rumsfeld’s plan to set up “lily-pads,” or small bases around the world that can be activated in a hurry to provide access to US troops.

In fact, the trigger to change the position of Russia and China has been their fear that the recent dramatic events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may have increased US influence in the region. In the spring, Kyrgyzstan’s long term President Askar Akayev was swept from power and replaced by an interim government headed by Kumanbek Bakiyev, who on July 10 won the first free and fair presidential elections held in Central Asia.

Both China and Russia have thrown their weight behind the region’s autocratic rulers in order to prevent further regime change or moves towards greater democracy.

The role played by US-funded NGOs and events in Kyrgyzstan, although far from the democratic revolutions that swept Georgia and Ukraine, angered Russia and China. Moscow especially felt that the loss of its former communist satraps in Central Asia would weaken its influence and usher in pro-US leaders.

In Uzbekistan, however, the Pentagon faces a far more difficult task. The massacre of protestors by President Islam Karimov’s security forces in Andijan on May 13, sparked worldwide outrage against the regime. The killings of an estimated 700 innocent people led to condemnation by the US, the UN and the European Union and a demand for an independent enquiry into the massacre, which Karimov refused.

Since the Andijan massacre, Karimov has been assiduously courted by Russia and China. He has visited both countries and enlisted their support in rejecting calls for an independent enquiry. Russia, which has had an on-again-off-again relationship with Karimov in the past has now cemented its relationship, while China has extracted oil and gas concessions from Uzbekistan.

Since the SCO summit all three Central Asian states with Western bases have themselves called on the US to review base agreements, although as Kyrgyz leaders made clear, they were being forced to do so by Russia. As General Richard Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it: “It looks to me like two very large countries were trying to bully some smaller countries.”

Although Uzbekistan has not yet agreed to the continued base facility, it is unlikely to seriously want the Americans out. Uzbek leaders were happy to become US partners after 9/11 in order to receive greater US aid, but also to keep the demands of Russia and China at a distance and balance out the three superpowers in the region.

None of the Central Asian countries can afford to antagonise the US to the extent that Russia wants them to. They are just as keen to keep Russia at a distance. Ultimately they will reassure the Americans about base agreements, albeit charging bigger fees. They will then have to appease Russia and China, possibly by granting Russia additional basing rights.

When Secretary Rumsfeld returns home this week he will have won the first skirmish in the battle for the control of Central Asia, but maintenance of the US bases and political influence will now require closer and constant attention. The Great Game that once preoccupied Czarist Russia and the British Empire has just been revived, and the stakes are higher than ever.

Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistani expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, is the author of ‘Taliban’ and ‘Jihad’. This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright (c) 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Is Pakistan global centre for terrorism?

Daily Times, July 29, 2005
Pakistan called ‘global centre for terrorism’

By Khalid Hasan

Washington: “Pakistan remains the global centre for terrorism and for the remnants of Al Qaeda, which is still very strong here,” according to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid.

In an interview published by the German weekly newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, Rashid is quoted as saying, “The fact is, after September 11, despite the many crackdowns made by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, we haven’t effectively shut down the Pakistani militant groups. The reason for that is that these groups are very closely tied into the military’s foreign policy, especially with respect to Kashmir and Afghanistan. The militant groups here have not been crushed and if the madrassas they control - they all control a certain number of such religious schools - are not shut down, we’re not going to see an end to militancy here.”

Asked about the London bombings, the Pakistani journalist who writes for a number of foreign newspapers and is author of the best-selling book ‘The Taliban,’ Rashid replied that people in Pakistan were very apprehensive after the bombing, but the connection with Pakistan did not come as a surprise. “It was clear there was a great danger that the Pakistani community in London would carry out such an attack. It is well known that the Muslim community there is very radical - at least some of them. People also knew many of them had connections in Pakistan.” He explained that the roots of the attack, however, were in England, since there has been an “enormous radicalisation” of British Muslims in the last few years and especially since 9/11.

“There are radical preachers, there are radical mosques. There are lots of schools there which have been teaching students the Koran on Friday afternoons and at the same time radicalising them. There is no dearth of ideological training in England,” he added.

As to the question if President Musharraf was “doing enough,” Rashid replied, “When crackdowns do occur, they aren’t effective. Three hundred, or even 2,000, people are picked up, they’re held for 90 days and then they are freed as soon as the attention and pressure from the West has stopped. There has never been an organised campaign to combat it. It has never taken place.”

Asked what the message of the president in his July 7 speech was, the Pakistani journalist said, “His main message was a very positive one. He said we must combat extremism and launch a jihad against radicalism. He asked that people mobilise and not vote for extremists and so on. But there has been no shortage of such speeches. The main question is whether they will be followed by any meaningful action.”

As to the Pakistani president’s opinion that the bombers were born and bred British citizens, Rashid said the message was that you don’t need to come to Pakistan to become a fanatic. You can become a fanatic in Yorkshire, in Leeds or anywhere in England because there’s enough extremism there too. That’s what President Musharraf was alluding to, he added. To a question about what the Pakistani leader could do to “energetically combat fanaticism and terrorism,” Rashid’s answer was, “The biggest mistake the West has made with Pakistan since 9/11 has been the pursuit of private diplomacy. It hasn’t been made public. The West should spell out exactly what is expected of Pakistan and the regime. US President George W Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, they keep praising Pakistan and saying it is doing a great job hunting down Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but behind the scenes they are whistling a completely different tune. The West needs to have one policy which should be in the public domain. Then the Pakistani public would insist that Musharraf fulfil these demands.”

When Der Spiegel pointed out that President Musharraf was trying to walk a “fine line,” because of radical elements at home, Rashid replied that this argument had been in use for the last four years. The fact is, he added, that Gen Musharraf is still there, still very much in power and “absolutely nothing has been done about extremism.”

In his view, “It is clear that Musharraf has a very political agenda. He wants to be re-elected in 2007 and he wants to remain in office until 2012. And for that, he needs votes. At the same time, though, he has been trying to be a good partner with the West. But his political agenda takes precedence over any commitments to combating extremism and terrorism. An army general cannot have a political agenda while he is trying to crack down on terror.”

The Pakistani correspondent and commentator expressed the view that if Gen Musharraf were to leave the scene for some reason, the army would take over again. “People are afraid because the country has nuclear weapons and they think the country would fall apart. I don’t believe any of that would happen. There would be continuity.”

As for the madrassas and their reform, Rashid did not believe the London bombers came to Pakistan to attend a madrassa, but to make contacts with militant groups and possibly to get training. He added that 80 percent of the madrassas are playing their traditional role, but a number of them have been taken over by militant groups and become recruiting platforms for them. It is difficult to close them down because they are run by the militant groups Gen Musharraf needs for other aspects of his foreign policy.

Rashid said Osama Bin Laden was on the run and his main priority at the moment was to stay alive. At the most, he may be able to provide some strategic directives through his support group, but he is not in a position to run day-to-day operations. He added, “He is certainly in Pakistan because Pakistan has traditionally had the best infrastructure for Al Qaeda. I don’t think the Pakistani military knows where he is, but they aren’t looking very hard either because they fear the military support they get from the United States would disappear as soon as Bin Laden is caught.

Thursday, July 28, 2005

US should support democratic forces in Pakistan: USIP study

Daily times, July 28, 2005

US should support democratic forces in Pakistan: USIP study
By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A new study released by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) calls on the United States to help Pakistan pursue a path that meets its people’s democratic aspirations and socioeconomic needs and is resilient enough to accommodate linguistic, regional, religious, and sectarian differences, as only such a course can help Pakistan become a stable and responsible member of the international community, at peace with itself and with its neighbours.

The study by former Pakistani diplomat and senior USIP fellow Touqir Hussain rules out US sanctions against Pakistan as a policy option, but adds that the United States should put some pressure on Pakistan to keep the country’s reform effort on track and to induce it to act as a responsible nuclear power. Washington would be well advised not to allow Pakistan to feel that it needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs it. A confident and secure Pakistan, the study maintains, is more likely to define its future in economic terms and wage peace with India and be a natural ally of the United States. As such, it recommends, Pakistan’s peace process with India must be supported by the United States. However, the benefits to Pakistan must counterbalance the effects of a “renunciation of Kashmir” and the attendant “loss of national honour” this will cause. The study admits that anti-Americanism exists in Pakistan, but argues that it can be toned down if the United States reaches out to liberal forces, the business community, and the female population.

Hussain argues that Pakistan’s multiple problems are now seamlessly linked and need to be attacked simultaneously. Above all, Pakistan needs to change its external behaviour to strengthen its internal order, rather than pursue external goals at the expense of its internal stability. But because of his lack of legitimacy, Musharraf is dependent on forces resistant to change. These include the mullas, whose extremism ironically he is fighting against, and the traditionally pro-establishment politicians who, like Musharraf, themselves have legitimacy problems and are fighting shy of reforms for fear of the mullahs and of social change that may erode the feudal and social structure they represent.

Further, the support of the army, Musharraf’s main constituency, imposes its own cost. By offering the military civilian jobs and economic and commercial incentives, the army’s stake in its domination of political power only grows further and comes at the expense of democracy. Musharraf has disparate allies with discordant agendas, none of whom can offer him unqualified support.

While each may support him on one issue, they may oppose him on another. Thus, with each reform that is made another must be sacrificed.

The former Pakistani ambassador writes, “Criticism provoked by his alignment with the United States and suspicions that his reforms are at the behest of the United States have also weakened Musharraf. Indeed, the strongest resistance to him comes from the Islamists, whose tolerance toward him has already been stretched to the limit by his cooperation in the war on terrorism. He is afraid to test it any further, as he is expending most of his political capital on complying with the US war on terrorism and securing his own survival, both personal and political. As a consequence, Musharraf’s reforms, except for his opening to India - and for the vastly improved financial sector under the direction of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz - have been fitful and insufficient.”

Hussain maintains that US policy choices towards Pakistan are “complex and imperfect.” Though Pakistan is not a failed state nor a failing or a rogue state, it has had to varying degrees tendencies of all three. On top of that, it is a nuclear power. Pakistan is now not only a challenge but also a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. The United States faces a great balancing act in its relations with Pakistan. “It must work with President Pervez Musharraf but not identify with his personal ambitions, nudge him to democratise but not discourage his strong hand, and advance US nonproliferation objectives but not lose Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism,” he suggests. He sees new threats and opportunities for US foreign policy in South Asia.

On relations with India, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Brazil, Spain and Japan believes only time will tell if there has been an enduring change in India’s strategic stance toward Pakistan or the Kashmir dispute. India’s hope is that in time because of closer links and liberal exchanges, Pakistanis will develop a different perception of India and Kashmir. India also hopes that other critical issues, such as energy, sharing of water resources, security, and good neighbourly relations, may eventually take precedence over Kashmir in defining the countries’ relationship, freeing India to find an internal solution to the dispute, facilitated by Pakistan’s diminished leverage and unforced concessions. “There might be gains for Pakistan in the relationship with India, but not in Kashmir, whose centrality to India-Pakistan relations will have gradually eroded. There is no guarantee the Indian ploy will work unless the Pakistan leadership itself has made a strategic decision to acquiesce to such a fait accompli. There is no firm indication this decision has been made. Nor is there a national consensus about India in Pakistan, as the public does not have a clear idea about what will come of the peace initiative. Indeed, in both countries domestic constituencies against normalisation have yet to be conciliated, so the potential for renewed tensions between India and Pakistan remains.

Hussain agues that though General Musharraf’s “enlightened moderation” is compatible with US objectives, both face dilemmas in the implementation of this reengagement. The principal challenge the US faces in Pakistan is securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism.

Questions over what would happen if Musharraf were eliminated reflect how much the United States has staked its relationship with Pakistan on a single individual. Rather than being preoccupied with the personal fate of Musharraf, the United States should focus on Pakistan’s democratisation. “The essential truth is that after years of living dangerously, Pakistan has been in a mess that can only be sorted out now by some measure of strong government, a ‘soft authoritarianism.’” The United States faces a “delicate balancing act” between supporting him in his reform efforts and being critical of his army-dominated rule that preempts democratisation efforts.

The former envoy is of the opinion that General Musharraf needs to realise that enlightened moderation is more than cultural liberalisation and that only political liberalisation will help strengthen liberal and secular forces, which can be his allies in defeating religious extremism. If this is not understood, then cultural openness could backfire and give further ammunition to fundamentalists, provoking a cultural war that gets entangled with political stability. Pakistan’s “quasi-reactionary” system, dominated by tribal interests will only be able to change Pakistan modestly before it itself becomes a “roadblock to change.” He also warns that Pakistan’s economic development will remain limited if the country does not come to terms with problems of poor public services, corruption, inequities in land and income distribution and social exclusions of women and other marginalised sections of society. Economic change will foster a middle class, Hussain argues, that may help lead the balance of economic and political power away from the feudal stranglehold. Musharraf should work towards this end and prepare the country for full restoration of parliamentary and civilianised democracy in 2007. “Beyond 2007, the army should have only a watchdog role in the government. This should be for a designated period of time, provided there is a national consensus and constitutional support for the idea.”

Hussain believes that Pakistan’s problems are not lack of institutions but “trivialization” of institutions. If institutions are not working, it is because they have been dominated by their subservience to the dominant centres of power. They can only be reformed if the social and political structure is first reformed. Education and social sectors are in a dysfunctional state and need to be urgently repaired and rehabilitated.

Hussain sums up future US interests in the region as not just “the looming strategic shadow of a resurgent China, but also of India and possibly of Russia.” There is also the risk of a possible surge in radical Islam in the region fostered by the inevitable crumbling of some of the conservative or repressive Arab regimes. This would be compounded by a nuclear Iran. China is already positioning itself to fill any future power vacuum caused by any receding US standing in the region and has begun building bridges with Iran and India. As a result, the US-Pakistan relationship will increasingly intersect with issues that go far beyond the war on terrorism.

There is, therefore, a compelling rationale for the United States to remain engaged in the region. And given its geopolitical environment and dependence on borrowed power, as well as its chronic domestic weaknesses that may take time to heal, Pakistan could remain a friend and possibly even an ally, he concludes.

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Concept of Muslims as "victims" - need for re-thinking

Daily Times, July 26, 2005
SECOND OPINION: The Muslims may not be so ‘mazloom’ —Khaled Ahmed’s TV Review

Ayaz Amir was right but Ahmad Javed, whose purism is normally frightening, agreed with him from a defeatism which is equally threatening to normal life. Secularism has to be accepted with sincerity, not because the Muslims are retrograde

The theme of the victimhood of the Muslims has gained currency and, as non-Muslims die at the hands of Muslim terrorists all over the world, the Pakistani TV channels have turned up the rhetoric about mazloom Muslims. In Sudan, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc, Muslims are killing non-Muslims or Muslims. No one talks about it because Muslims feel nothing for non-Muslims in the name of humanity. The OIC may not be active against Britain and the United States, but it is equally supine when it comes to Sudanese Arabs killing Sudan’s non-Arab Muslims.

GEO (9 July 2005) Aniq Ahmad discussed the plight of the Muslims with Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi, Mr Ahmad Javed, journalist Ayaz Amir and Mutahir Hussain of Karachi University. Aniq Ahmad that Muslims were being subjected to suffering, and their life had become difficult (dubhar kar diya hai). What was the way out of this?

Why should the TV host decide the question of victimhood? If he had it in his mind he should have invited guests to argue the question. Are the Muslims of Chechnya mazloom? If you look at the way the Chechens behaved within the Russian Republic, it doesn’t appear to be so. In the beginning Moscow was willing to give the Chechens the same deal that it gave to the Tatars (flag, anthem, foreign trade, banking). But Khattab entered Chechnya with wahhabi Islam and its blood-letting.

OIC could not support Chechnya’s freedom because it was a different model from the republics. The Union had broken up, not the republics. Later, Russia did not cover itself with glory while putting down the Chechens. Mullah Umar would not agree to relent after 9/11 because his daughter had married Osama Bin Laden’s son. The Taliban killed a lot of Muslims before being attacked by ISAF.

On Iraq, the Americans were wrong and the Iraqi Muslims suffered because of that. But there too one must not ignore the fact that Muslims kill Muslims the same way as in Afghanistan earlier. Sunnis are killing Shias in Iraq; Shias are killing Sunnis in Beirut. The same sort of thing is happening in Pakistan. (If you want to be professional victims like the Jews, then behave like them too.) The Muslims have their share of the mazloom, but a TV host has no business presenting himself and all the other otherwise zalim Muslims as mazloom.

Thanvi said that 9/11 was a conspiracy against the Muslims. No proof of Muslims being involved was given. Ayaz Amir said the pretext of attacking Iraq was a pack of lies. He lamented that the Muslims did not protest against America while Europe did and many in America opposed the policy of Bush. He said the Islamic world was bankrupt and that OIC was of no value. It did not even verbally condemn the United States. He said umma did not exist in practice.

Aniq said there was a distance between Muslims and Muslim rulers. Ahmad Javed said that umma was a thought not a reality. Muslims thought one way but lived another way. Muslim masses had leaders that did not represent them. Mutahir said that this was the age of nation states and each state looked to its self-interest whereas umma was a supranational concept. There was also the question of Arab and non-Arab in the Islamic world. He said Muslim rulers used war and fear of war to perpetuate themselves on Muslim masses.

Maulana Thanwi is one of the less cerebral clerics. The 9/11 incident cannot be quoted as a conspiracy against Islam. It may have highlighted many issues that the West must address; but this is not one of them. Why condemn the OIC if it is not a military organisation and, unlike the UN, doesn’t have permanent members with power to sanction and invade under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter?

Umma is subversive of the nation state and Mutahir was right in his view. The damage the concept of the umma does and will do to the Muslims cannot be quantified. Islamic rejectionism of all political orders including democracy in favour of a utopia is the other significant factor in the Muslim plight. Ahmad Javed’s accusation about Muslims not living and thinking seamlessly is frightening because it can give rise to fascism, and it negates democracy as a system in which each lives freely according to his lights.

Aniq said Muslims were living in the Makki period. Thanvi added that it was in fact the time of jahiliyya. Aniq said Muslims were mazloom but did not attract sympathy of others. Thanvi said that jihad was duty and the first terrorists were the men (Jews) who crucified Christ.

He accused the jihadi organisations of working for the United States against Russia and the defeat of Russia had enabled America to designate Islam as its next global rival. Ayaz Amir agreed with it but recommended that Muslims should also raise themselves through knowledge like the Jews.

A reference to Makki period implies that a Madani period is to follow with an equally implied conquest. This is a bad thought to encourage. Jihad is not the duty to emphasise in this day and age. Pakistan has suffered because of it. The view that Muslims should study other variable means of progress was more relevant.

Aniq suggested that Muslims should follow the example of Jews and Christians but Ahmad Javed objected that Muslims had ideological opposition to the two. If they were right then Muslims were wrong and vice versa. He said the real enemy was capitalism. He said the West was an enemy because it was capitalist; Saudi Arabia was an enemy for the same reason. Mutahir suggested that Muslims should reach a consensus on jihad. Thanvi said jihad was essential to Islam.

Ayaz Amir then suggested that Muslims could only prosper by going secular, separating religion from politics, but he feared that he would be apostatised for saying so. Ahmad Javed agreed with him after saying that historically speaking it was true that the Muslims had not been able to integrate religion with all life, including politics.

Ayaz Amir was right but his view was clearly in the way of a rebuke. Ahmad Javed, whose purism is normally frightening, agreed with it from a defeatism which is equally threatening to normal life. Secularism has to be accepted with sincerity, not because the Muslims are retrograde, because then they will ruin secularism too.

GEO (12 July 2005) had Iftikhar Ahmad interviewing ex-PPP leader Mr Hafeez Pirzada who said that in 1977 when Bhutto was conducting talks with the PNA, he never thought that his army chief General Zia would betray him. In fact he reposed trust in him till the last.

Bhutto’s greatest mistake was that he left Pakistan for a foreign visit when he had almost clinched a political deal on re-elections with the PNA although there were Asghar Khan and Pir Pagaro who did not want reconciliation. The foreign visit lost Bhutto 10 days in which the army chief made up his mind.

He said PPP’s slogan of roti, kapra and makan was incompatible with Bhutto’s determination to fight India for a thousand years. Bhutto greatest blunder was sending the army into Balochistan. He ignored the party workers and relied on the feudals for winning elections and also relied on bureaucrats and thugs like Masood Mehmood and Tamman to run the administration.

What Pirzada was not asked was whether he ever protested to Bhutto on policy and whether he was ever threatened. Others like Rafi Raza were. The party’s founder member and secretary general JA Rahim was actually beaten up and his anus was stuffed with red chillies. He stated this in TV. *

Sunday, July 24, 2005

Good Day for India, Bad for Nonproliferation

Good Day for India, Bad for Nonproliferation
America's short-sighted nuclear deal with India might lead to a breakdown of the nonproliferation regime

Strobe Talbott
YaleGlobal, 21 July 2005

Lending a nuclear hand: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush signed a deal giving India privileges of a nuclear power. (Photo: Whitehouse)

WASHINGTON: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh received a warm (indeed, as it happened, sweltering) welcome on the South Lawn of the White House, a rare banquet (the equivalent of a state dinner), presidential hospitality for the Indian CEOs who were part of Indian official entourage, a reaffirmation of the two countries' determination to fight terrorism together, and a raft of agreements that should improve the climate for commercial cooperation.

However, the headline outcome of the Manmohan Singh visit was not good news for a cause to which both his government and the United States are sincerely committed: nuclear nonproliferation. President Bush agreed to give India virtual membership in the club of recognized nuclear-weapons states created by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The NPT dates back to 1968, when five states had tested nuclear weapons: Britain, China, France, Russia (then the Soviet Union), and the US. The treaty was a deal between them and the rest of the world; the "haves" would, over time, negotiate the reduction and eventual elimination of their nuclear arsenals (The latter goal was a blue-sky dream that has never been seriously pursued.), and the "have-nots" would refrain from acquiring nukes in exchange for financial and technical assistance in developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

By conducting an underground test that caught the world by surprise in May 1998, India put itself unambiguously and irreversibly outside the bounds of the treaty. Pakistan, which quickly followed suit, is in a similar category. So is Israel, which is universally assumed to have nukes – even though it hasn't acknowledged ever testing one – while North Korea is believed to have at least a couple of bombs, if not more.

The joint statement that President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released on July 18 affirms that India has demonstrated a commitment to using its growing power responsibly. There is little doubt on that score. Unlike Pakistan, which has been called the Wal-Mart of illicit commerce in dangerous technology, India has been careful not to let its nuclear material and know-how fall into the wrong hands.

The Indians have also long claimed that the NPT unfairly grandfathered China, India's rival and sometimes-adversary, into the nuclear club while keeping India itself out on the grounds that it had not tested a weapon when the treaty was completed. Not only does the Bush administration accept that logic – so did the Clinton administration. That was why, rather than insisting that India join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, the US has, for much of the past seven years, tried to work out a genuine compromise. Such an agreement would give India more access to technology necessary for its civilian nuclear energy program in exchange for meaningful constraints on its weapons program, consistent with its own declared policy of wanting to have only a "credible minimum deterrent."

By all indications, the Bush administration last week gave up on that tradeoff and granted India the privileges of a NPT member with very little in return.

In one important respect, the Indians have received more leniency than the five established nuclear "haves" have asked for themselves: The US, Britain, France, Russia, and China say they have halted the production of the fissile material that goes into nuclear bombs, while India has only promised to join a universal ban that would include Pakistan – if such a thing ever materializes. Yet that pledge, in the future conditional tense, was apparently enough for the Bush administration.

Since the president came into office four years ago, he made clear in word and deed that he did not share his predecessors' confidence in international treaties and institutions. In addition to putting the kibosh on the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, he pulled the US out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, significantly weakened the strategic arms reduction process, suspended or halted a variety of other arms-control and nonproliferation agreements, and associated himself with the Republican refusal in the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Hints continue to come from the Pentagon and elsewhere that the US may proceed with a new generation of nuclear weapons that will, its advocates say, require a resumption of American testing.

No wonder the NPT – originally an American idea that depends on unstinting American support – is in jeopardy. And no wonder the world has been watching warily to see how the US handles India and other outliers of the NPT.

The short answer is: selectively and unilaterally, without much regard for rules that apply to everyone.

India and the United States have both shown a penchant for going it alone – India in defying the international community (including the US) with its tests, the Bush administration in attacking Iraq over the objections of the United Nations and many of its own closest allies. If the Indian and American versions of unilateralism reinforce one other, it will work to the detriment of institutions like the United Nations and risk turning treaties like the NPT from imperfect but useful mechanisms into increasingly ineffectual ones.

The administration – taking its lead from the president himself – tends to see the world in black-and-white, good-versus-evil terms. That view has translated into a nonproliferation policy that cuts extra slack for "good" countries, like India, while cracking down on "bad" ones – in other words, rogue states like North Korea and Iran.

But the world is full of countries – many of them, like India, certifiably "good" ones – that have, for decades, stuck with the original NPT deal and forgone the nuclear option. Quite a few did so even though they had the technological capability and what they regarded as the geopolitical pretext for doing otherwise: Brazil, Japan, South Africa, and South Korea, to name just a few.

Seeing the outcome of Singh's visit to Washington, some – perhaps many – of those nuclear have-nots will be more inclined to regard the NPT as an anachronism, reconsider their self-restraint, and be tempted by the precedent that India has successfully established and that now, in effect, has an American blessing.

It is in that context that what both the Indian and American governments hailed as a breakthrough in relations between the two countries is a step toward a breakdown in the international nonproliferation regime.

There is also an important though officially muted – sometimes denied – anti-Chinese subtext to what happened when Mr. Singh came to Washington. By the Bush standard, China, as the world's largest non-democracy, is a long way from proving itself to be on the right side of the good-versus-evil dividing line. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on record, in an article she wrote in Foreign Affairs during the 2000 presidential campaign, with the argument that the US should regard India as a strategic counterweight to China. That consideration, which dropped out of administration rhetoric after 9/11, is making a bit of comeback in official Washington. It no doubt further inclined the administration to accede to India's aspirations not just for special treatment in general, but for special treatment under the NPT.

All this does not negate the positive accomplishments of the summit in the spheres of trade, economics, and counterterrorism. But it means that while President Bush and Prime Minister Singh advanced the goal of making the US and India into "natural allies," they and their successors will, as a result of the short-sighted nuclear deal, face a more dangerous world.

Strobe Talbott is the president of the Brookings Institution (www.brookings.edu). As deputy secretary of state, he was President Clinton's special envoy for South Asia after the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998. He is the author of "Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb" (Brookings Institution Press).

Rights:
© 2005 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Development of Islamic law in South Asia

The News, July 25, 2005
Development of Islamic law in South Asia
Feuilleton
Prof Khwaja Masud

Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) and his school of thought have been the predominant influence in the Sunni Muslim religions and intellectual life from the mid-18th century. Maulana Maudoodi has described him in Tajdeed-o-Ahya-i-Deen as "an independent-minded thinker and commentator whose thoughts have broken free of the limitations of circumstances and time."

Among Shah Waliullah's main contribution is the fact that he broke the shackles of taqleed (compulsory adherence to any one of the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence), which has been the single biggest factor in the intellectual stagnation of Islam.

His main point of departure was the attempt to work out the social basis underlying the Qur'aanic injunctions. The Shariah, he pointed out, only aims at the reform of society. But no Shariah takes place in a vacuum. It develops in the context and on the basis of usage and customs of the society concerned. This is also true of the Islamic Shariah. The customs of the Arabs, and, among them of the tribe of Quraish, constituted the raw material of the Shariah of Islam.

Iqbal also took the same line. After giving a summary of the prophetic method as explained by Shah Waliullah in Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam, he says: "The Shariah values (ahkam) resulting from this application (for example, rules referring to penalties for crimes, are in a sense specific to those people, and since their observance is not an end in itself, they cannot be strictly enforced in the case of future generations).

Preceding Iqbal, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan independently discussed the principles of the exegesis of the Quran. He was dealing with the issue when the discoveries of natural sciences were sought to be rejected on the plea of being opposed to the Quranic text. Sir Syed argued for the word of God (revealed text) to be understood in terms of the work of God (i.e. nature); its meaning, he said, will have to be reinterpreted in the light of ever growing human knowledge and the latest discoveries of science. The word of God (revealed text) must go hand in hand with the work of God i.e. natural laws. Sir Syed applied the same principle of exegesis of the Quran in matters concerning social affairs.

Moulvi Chiragh carried forward Sir Syed's ideas in a more radical way. He says in Azam-ul-Kalaam fi Irtiqa-ul-Islam: "The most essential civil and political problems of Islamic Shariah said to be based on the Quran have been deduced from a single word or sometimes from a single phrase. Uncalled for insistence on following the letter, neglect of the true intent of the Quran has become a characteristic of our exegesists and our jurists. Of the six thousand verses in the Quran there are only about two hundred which relate not only to civil, penal, fiscal and political matters, but also to prayers and religious rites. It is obvious that these verses cannot provide definite guidance or specific rules about civil law."

About the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH) Maulvi Chiragh maintained that the Prophet, his companions, and successors had condemned the practice of compiling the traditions, thus denuding them of religions authority.

Maulvi Chiragh notes that none of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence has claimed any finality for their conclusions.

Let us see what the Quaid-e-Azam had to say on the matter. On February 6, 1912, an amendment to the special (civil) Marriages Act was moved by Bhupendra Nath Basu in the Legislative Council. It sought to provide for the registration of civil marriages between persons belonging to different religions denominations. Till then, both the parties to such marriages had to declare that they belonged to no religion. The amendment was lost. But the 1912 amendment is memorable for Jinnah's speech on the subject.

When Mohammad Ali Jinnah rose to speak, the law member, Sir Ali Imam, drew his attention to the Quranic injunction prohibiting Muslim men from marrying women outside the people of the Book (Ahl-i-Kitab), and, of course the Muslims, and a Muslim woman from marrying any but a Muslim.

Jinnah, then, reminded the law member that it was the first occasion in India that the Council had either ignored or amended Islamic Law in such a way as to make it suitable to meet the requirements of the times. He cited many examples. The Islamic Law of contract was not recognised any more. The Islamic penal law which had continued to be in force even after the establishment of the British rule in India, had been completely abrogated. The Law of Evidence as set forth in the Islamic Law was nowhere prevalent in the country. Then there was the caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1854. Under the Islamic Law, a person in the event of apostasy lost all rights of inheritance. This, too, had been abrogated.

"I submit", said Jinnah, "that these laws are the precedence which we should follow in order to be able to meet the requirements of the times. For this many a precedence can be found in Islamic Law."

On August 4, 1955, a seven-man commission was appointed to study the existing laws of marriage, divorce, and family maintenance to determine whether these laws needed modifications in order to give women their proper place in society according to the fundamentals of Islam.

Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, secretary of the commission, wrote in the introduction to the majority report: "Islam is not the name of any static mode of pattern of life; it is spirit and not body; it is an inspiration and not any temporal or rigid fulfilment. The essence of life is constituted of permanence and change. The ideal only is permanent; the changes or the regulations that with particular situations of a particular epoch can never assume the status of the ideal."

The trouble with the dogmatists and traditionalists as Khalifa Abdul Hakim sees it, had been that they confused the permanent ideal with the temporary regulations.As a result, Islam lies buried beneath the heap of retrograde legalism, its spirit smothered by centuries of obscurantism, clericalism and dogmatism.

Too often, too many people have been duped in the name of Islam. But obscurantism stands doomed, though the struggle is tough and hard.

The writer is a former principal, Gordon College, Rawalpindi.
Email: khmasud22@yahoo.com

A Sermon is a Sermon!

Daily Times, July 24, 2005
A sermon is a sermon!
Iqbal Mustafa

As I watched the President’s address to the nation on Thursday, I had mixed feelings of hope and despair. First, his interpretation of history -- the occupation of Afghanistan by Russia and the liberation struggle by Afghan tribes assisted by Jihadis from many Muslim countries, who were "brought in" according to him, trained, armed and then abandoned by the US, for Pakistan to reap the consequences of their militancy -- conveniently omitted the pivotal role of Pakistan army. It did not mention the windfall bonanzas made by key military individuals. Putting all the blame on someone else’s doorstep and asking for more assistance indicated that the military establishment is still in denial.

More than that, before announcing new measures for curbing militant ideologies sprouting from the seminaries, he felt the compulsion to establish his own credentials as a devout Muslim -- a blue-blooded Syed. He talked of a distinction between an enlightened Islam and an antediluvian form of it that the Muslim clergy is propagating today, specifically highlighting that the Mullahs are 'behind times’. The logical inference of his line of argument leads to the suggestion that the Faith is subject to mutation with time, which is a fundamental denial of immutability of tenets of Islam. He even invoked the theological term of 'Jihad’ against the militants. In essence, I agree with what he is trying to achieve but his 'strategic logic’ is self-defeating. By starting an 'interpretation’ debate, he is playing on his opponents’ turf; it is a debate that has remained unresolved for centuries. I am quoting an excerpt from my book, 'Dysfunctional Democracy: A case for an alternative political system’, which presents a different logic towards the same end.

"Pakistan is trapped between an emotive resistance to abandon the past theological heritage (as if that would be disloyalty to faith) and a realistic compulsion to become a part of the global liberalism in politics and economics, which is secular in spirit. The society, as a whole, is not finding a way to dispel the myth that the two urges are contradicting. Hence, there is a dichotomy of thought and actions. In one’s private life it is relatively easy to pledge allegiance to faith while compromising on practical compliance, which is not so in matters of a communal commitment to a set of principles, let alone a sanctimonious creed.

A liberal democracy entails secular principles, which exclude theological injunctions from matters of public domain, in the sense that they are not enshrined verbatim in the statutes. Religious morality is exercised through public consensus rather than policing by clerical decrees. The process of democratisation began with renaissance in Europe when State was divorced from the Church explicitly. Hence, there exists considerable variation between the opinion of the Church and political consensus in all democracies of the West: e.g., divorce, abortion, birth control, laws on homosexuality and pornography, blasphemy, gambling, prostitution and use of alcohol. While on many of such issues, a part of public morality does not condone what the law permits; the State voluntarily abdicates the right to interfere in individual liberty, leaving it to be a matter between God and man. George Bush, a man driven by personal religious convictions, when he publicly denounced the papal comments on America’s intent to attack Iraq, demonstrated a glaring example of this dichotomy between State and Church.

The strings of Islamic injunctions embedded in Pakistan’s constitution and in statutes of civil and criminal law are in denial of the fundamental principles of a liberal democracy. Pakistan has earned international ill repute through implementation of many court rulings on matters of rape, marriage, blasphemy and interest in banking. As per the strict punishments laid out in Islamic Shariah, if an accused were to be publicly whipped, stoned or had limbs amputated, Pakistan would become a pagan society, just as the Taliban were.

A far more serious import of Islamisation of constitution and laws culminates in abdication of interpretation of Islam to the clergy. If Pakistan were acknowledged as a divine mission to be run according to the interpretation of a particular sect of theological schools then there would be no need for democratic process of elections, parliaments and constitutional structures. This ambivalence of constitutional essence dilutes the concept of liberal democracy, and as the process of reshaping Muslim countries unfolds, the international community is viewing it suspiciously as an impediment to progress. As referred to earlier, many dictatorial regimes have made economic and social progress but they all had one thing in common: a secular mindset. Only through natural resources have some Muslim countries prospered at a cost of social liberty like Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other Muslim countries that have progressed to join the middle-income countries, like Turkey and Malaysia, are secular constitutionally. Dubai and other Gulf States have grown exponentially in recent times through liberalisation of culture and economy.

In historical context, the ambiguity is older than Pakistan itself. Seeking guidance in the statements of the founding father for a clear concept of Pakistan is not of much help. His earlier statements endorse a theological vision while his latter addresses categorically call for a secular state. Are there any lessons in this diversity of thought from Quaid-e-Azam? Proponents of theological compulsion in State matters quote his previous statements while the liberals seek instruction in his latter speeches. This debate cannot be resolved easily in scholastic sense. There is enough evidence to suggest that Quaid-e-Azam altered his vision at different times in view of the situation that faced the Muslims. At the earlier stages there was a need to assert the rights of Muslims to seek political exclusivity but once that need was fulfilled, his vision of the future for Pakistan is quite clear. We may surmise two conclusions here: Nothing is immutable in matters of social perspectives; one must adapt to prevalent circumstances and needs of the times. Second, the future lies in moving away from a rigid view of religion towards a liberal democratic state. If the father of the nation could entertain such plurality of thought and liberalist view of faith, then a review of the constitution in contemporary terms is neither a heresy nor an act of disloyalty to the faith.

Until now, we have examined the external and internal forces that create exigencies to undertake a holistic review of Pakistan’s constitution. External, to align Pakistan with global standards of liberalisation and internal, to resolve two endemic problems -- find a cure for dysfunctional parliamentary system, discussed in earlier chapters, and prepare a valid legislative platform to neutralise Pakistan’s polity from theological bigotry, which can subsequently be translated into executive action against militant theological forces."

I was referring to a secular constitution without guilt or fear of betraying the Faith. President’s speech was a sermon. A sermon is a sermon whether delivered from a presidency or a preacher’s podium.

The writer is a consultant for agro economy and organisational management.
Email: mustafa@hujra.com; archives at www.hujra.com

Friday, July 22, 2005

Pakistan and London Bombings

Daily Times, July 23, 2005
COMMENT: Pakistan and the London bombings —Suroosh Irfani

We seem to have a paradoxical situation where many Pakistani youngsters seem more at home with a pluralistic ethos of Islam than their counterparts in Britain — the latter seem suspended between a cloistered ethnic world they have outgrown, and a Western world they cannot accept

Of the many comments to have appeared since London’s July 7 suicide bombings, an angry young voice from the British-Pakistani community, and a witness account of the community’s critical anguish, are especially noteworthy.

In “We rock the boat” (The Guardian, July 13), Dilpazier Aslam spotlights the Muslim anger behind the suicide bombers’ action, while Madeleine Bunting’s “Orphans of Islam” (The Guardian, July 18) looks at the history of Britain’s Mirpuris, the Pakistani Muslim community from which three of the four suicide bombers were supposedly drawn. The articles suggest, each in its own way, that besides political factors, there is an intra-Muslim dimension to the bombings — in other words, the bombings seem intertwined with the cultural dynamics of the British Pakistani community.

Aslam’s highly charged piece reflects the rage of a Muslim “sickened and angered by the events in Iraq”. He points to a virtual absence of an intra-Muslim dialog between cool elders and angry youngsters in a context where many Muslims feel that Islam is under siege. Moreover, the difference in the attitudes of the older and younger generations has come to a head because the younger lot is no longer afraid of hazarding risks:

“Second and third generation Muslims are without the don’t-rock-the boat attitude that restricted our forefathers,” says Aslam, “we are much sassier with our opinions, not caring if the boat rocks or not.”

To his rage-list, Aslam adds the imams whose sermons ignore American savagery in Iraq. He concludes, “The don’t-rock-the boat attitude of the elders doesn’t mean the agitation wanes; it means it builds until it can be contained no longer.”

In contrast to this fury against imams, elders and the West, Bunting speaks of an “unstoppable anguish and self criticism” that she witnessed at a meeting of young professional Muslims in London, who “struggled to find answers to how their faith could have nurtured such a perversion as suicide bombers in London.”

Those at the meeting believed that Muslims had to face up to the responsibility for their failure to transmit Islamic values and teachings as youngsters were lured away by extremist misinterpretations of Quranic verses on jihad.

Moreover, her study of the Mirpuris who account for some70 percent of British Pakistanis, suggests that the “soft” Sufism of Mirpuris, rooted in a 19th century Barelwi revivalist movement, had lost its lustre for the young. In fact, Barelwi Sufism had failed to adopt a contemporary idiom that the British-born could understand and identify with, mainly because patriarchal elders were replicating archaic notions by hiring an “Urdu speaking imam from the home village.”

The huge gap between the village imams and the urban youngsters has made Barelwi teachings virtually redundant for many of the young, forcing them to drift and look for other interpretations of Islam, more responsive to their concerns. That’s how these “orphans of Islam” became fair game for the radical Wahhabi Arabs who “spotted a constituency in these disaffected young Muslims.”

One could even say that these middle class British Muslims became the new avatars of a Cold War era jihad launched by the US and its allies against the Soviet-backed Afghan modernists. The bombers from Leeds were the latest edition of this US-midwifed jihad.

Even so, while the fallout of this US policy, that has now been globalised, needs to be acknowledged for what it is, Muslims need to critically engage with the inner structures of coercion and suppression naturalised in various aspects of their life. That such coercive structures are rife in the life of some British Muslims of Pakistani descent is reflected in Aslam’s writings in Khalifa.com, the UK-based magazine that represents the call for an Islamic Caliphate and is identified with neo pan-Islamists of mainly Pakistani origin.

For example, in “Differentiating between tradition and Islam” (Khilafah.com, 11 May, 2003) Aslam shares the travails of growing up as a British Muslim in a culturally cloistered atmosphere of suppression and coercion, where “many have grown up being smacked unnecessarily by their parents at home and by the ‘Maulana’ at the mosque.”

The mandatory two hours that he and his fellow youngsters spent every evening at the local Madrassa were something of a nightmare: “Often instead of being a productive two hours where minds are filled with clear understanding and powerful culture of Islam, for many it (became) something that they dread(ed) — two hours of memorisation and being beaten for a variety of reasons, ranging from making a mistake to talking to friends.”

However, the scars of beatings and humiliations were laughed off in later years when friends recalled “their painful days at the ‘Madrassa’ and compared the various methods of punishment the ‘Maulana’ would inflict, the most famous being the ‘Murgee’ (sic) or ‘chicken’ position”.

Indeed, while Aslam’s portrayal of the mosque, madrassa and the family with its forced marriages might be far removed from the lived experiences of many British Pakistani Muslims, as indeed much of the Pakistani middle class, the bleak picture he draws resonates with segments of Pakistan’s underclass, from which the “ignorant Maulanas” that Aslam mentions seem to be drawn. Moreover, it is ironic that while hardly any urban middle class Pakistani has ended up as a suicide bomber of Pakistan’s sectarian-terrorist outfits, some British Pakistanis have joined or worked with such groups.

A case in point is Omer Saeed Sheikh, an LSE dropout who became a member of Jaish-e Mohammad and joined forces with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Karachi to kidnap the Wall Street Journal journalist, Daniel Pearl, later beheaded by the terrorists.

In fact, while most Pakistanis are moving on with the times in a fledgling democracy, many British Pakistanis are weighed down by the self distortions of an over-defensive community against the Western “infidels” (kuffar) culture — as is evident in the unrelenting intra-Muslim debates of the various British Pakistani groups on the Internet.

Consequently, we seem to have a paradoxical situation where many Pakistani youngsters seem more at home with a pluralistic ethos of Islam (exemplified by the founding fathers Iqbal and Jinnah), than their counterparts in Britain — the latter seem suspended between a cloistered ethnic world they have outgrown, and a Western world they cannot accept.

Small wonder, then, that while some of these troubled hybrids of modernity are seeking refuge in Khilafat’s utopia to get over an inner split, others opt for more radical steps, of which suicide bombing could be the ultimate.

However, neither Khilafat’s triumphalism, nor jihadi fantasy are likely to take Pakistanis anywhere. While there is an urgent need for a global moral crusade for undoing international double standards and injustices against Muslims, an equally urgent jihad awaiting young Pakistanis is that of an intellectual struggle along the lines etched in Iqbal’s path-breaking lectures on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam: a blueprint for Muslim renewal through creative engagement with Western thought in the light of the Quran.

Suroosh Irfani is co-director of the Graduate Programme in Communication and Cultural Studies at National College of Arts, Lahore

Can Musharraf close the militant Madrassas?

The Daily Telegraph
July 22, 2005

Nothing will change until Musharraf closes Pakistan's militant madrassas
By Ahmed Rashid

LAHORE, July 23: In her first thriller, At Risk, Stella Rimington, the former head of MI-5, writes about a Pakistani militant who arrives by ferry boat in Britain to blow up the commander of a US-British air force base in the Fens. His main helper is an English girl who has converted to Islam and has been in a training camp in Pakistan, while MI5 misses several signals that an attack is coming.

Not surprisingly, when you are reading a novel by someone who has spent 35 years in the secret service, fact and fiction merge. The suspected Pakistani mastermind of the July 7 bombings is believed to have arrived by boat to trigger the four bombers, then left the country a day before the attack. Yesterday's bungling bombers seemed to lack such foreign expertise.

"There is no way you can deal with this menace [of terrorism] except head-on," said Prime Minister Tony Blair. Yet the truth of the matter is that neither government has tackled the issue of Islamic extremism head-on.

Until this month, terrorist attacks were long-distance events for most British people, but not for Pakistanis - 1,000 civilians and the same number of security personnel in that country have died since September 11 in terrorist and sectarian violence.

Britain has allowed militant Muslim preachers freedom to preach their message of hate in the mosques, the meeting halls and the sitting rooms of British Muslims. Literature and videos promoting extremism have been allowed to spread deep into the Muslim community. While some outsiders saw this as typical British eccentricity or liberalism, foreign intelligence agencies have been furious with British laxity for some years.

The four July 7 bombers did not have to enroll in a Pakistani religious school or madrassa to learn about Islamic extremism, because it was available in Yorkshire. Experts now think it unlikely that the three London bombers who came to Pakistan last year enrolled in a madrassa to become ideologised. Instead, they arrived fully brainwashed and probably used their time making contact with Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups to train in explosives.

And every Pakistani who saw the TV pictures of how British Pakistanis live in Leeds was shocked at how no attempt has been made to integrate them. The Leeds suburbs looked like ghettos or a typical poverty-stricken Punjabi village, except in red brick.

British Muslims also must share a great part of the blame for failing to speak out against the extremists living in their midst, refusing to integrate or agree to mixed marriages, and insisting upon bringing prayer leaders from their home villages - men who are either totally ignorant of the world or are extremists.

Immigrants are traditionally torn between their traditions and the modernity offered by the host country, but no group has more rigorously spurned modernity then Asian Muslims, which is a crying shame.

At the same time, the overwhelming anger that more than 60 per cent of Britons feel about Blair's policies in Iraq - according to a Guardian poll - is felt far more strongly in the Muslim community. The truth is that Blair will have great difficulty countering extremism among Asian Muslims while continuing to pursue the same Iraq policy.

Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has done even less to curb extremism, despite the daily hemorrhaging of his citizens on the streets of Pakistani cities due to terrorist attacks. On Monday, the general gave a tub-thumping speech to a youth conference, wagging his angry finger at the madrassas and repeating for the umpteenth time that banned militant groups were forcing their ideology on others.

This week, more than 250 militants have been arrested and, in a speech to the nation last night, Musharraf again asked the public to join him in a jihad against Islamic extremism. But since September 11, such crackdowns have taken place frequently, and those arrested are invariably freed after 90 days in jail.

Pakistanis now respond to such speeches with a wave of the hand and a bored look, commenting that it is all for the gallery of Western onlookers. Since September 11, the general has been through this routine so many times that people have lost count and interest. Despite all the political pressures on the military from the West since September 11, all the debt forgiveness by Western countries, the lavish foreign aid - $3 billion from Washington alone, new weapon systems and intelligence equipment and the rush of cash to reform the madrassa system - nothing much has changed.

Last night, Musharraf still failed to order the closure of madrassas controlled by extremist groups. The promised reform in 2002, which Musharraf pledged at meetings with Bush and Blair in Washington and London, has not been implemented. Until the London bombings, neither leader had bothered to ask Musharraf why not, although both have given funding for education.

Madrassas controlled by militant Pakistani groups who work for Al-Qaeda continue to function freely. One of the largest extremist groups in the country, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, has members who have helped Al-Qaeda It now operates under a new name and has even changed the look of its largest madrassa complex to become a model it can show to the Western press. It's like the Earls Court motor show without the short-skirted models.

The enormous Islamic extremist infrastructure that the military maintained before September 11 to fight its wars in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir have not been broken up, only put to temporary sleep while clandestine training camps still spring up at new locations. Some militant groups have been banned three times, only to re-appear under different names.

The failure of the West since September 11 has been to conduct its entire relationship with Musharraf in secret, as though that would give him the time and space to do the right thing. What is needed is a heavy dose of public diplomacy that would force the military to act rather than to deny and fudge. At the same time, Britain needs to wake up to the new post-July 7 world in which it will have to do far more to integrate its Muslim minority than it has done so far. - Daily Telegraph, London

Pakistan - A dying country?

Dawn, July 11, 2005
Perceptions of Pakistan

By A.R. Siddiqi

At a select gathering of intellectuals in Karachi recently, one of the speakers said: “Pakistan is a dying country. It is only a question of time.” Absolutely loud and clear: no mincing or garnishing of words. The pronouncement appeared by and large to be well taken by the audience.

That all is not well with the state of Pakistan goes without saying. We are a shambles. However, this is not unlike the condition in many other states around. The Soviet Union is dead and so is Yugoslavia; Bosnia stands partitioned; Iraq and Afghanistan stay under foreign rule, ripped off their historical moorings as a proud people even under autocratic regimes. What is so alarming therefore about seeing and calling Pakistan a ‘dying country’? This is not for the first time that Pakistan has been so described. A section of the foreign press, through the closing stages of the 1971 crisis, would invoke the same description for Pakistan. And that came to pass as half of the country did go away.

East Pakistan was Islamabad’s ‘other island’ —- more or less. And its loss was anticipated even manipulated (and hardly ever mourned) by the West Pakistani mainlanders. Now there is little left to give away. A ‘dying country’ means a whole people, a whole nation in the throes of death.

Why then must we still talk and hear of ‘a dying country’ and also greet it with muted applause? Is it the terminal manifestation of a crisis of identity — worse still a loss of it — or the end result of our progressive disengagement from the affairs of the state and the nation? National politics, the fine flowering of participatory democracy, is all but dead in Pakistan. Military rule would seem to have been suffering from lack of a fine balance between its tooth-to-tail ratio. The tail lashes somewhat spasmodically while the teeth have lost much of their bite.

The political apparatus has narrowed down to each party leadership’s selective agenda, without a national programme or manifesto. More than serving as a platform for the projection and advancement of public weal and aspirations, political parties, by and large, are reduced to acting as a group of in-feuding bodies up for grabs by those in power.

The government for its part seems split into an army of so many ministers and official spokesmen, each with his own version of a given incident or issue to leave us wondering about what the government is actually trying to say.

These last few days, the variety of versions pouring out through the media about certain major issues makes it difficult to decide which might be closer to the truth and to our national interest. Some of these could be tabulated as follows — US-Pakistan relations; the US-Indian strategic framework accord; up-and-down graph of progress on a resolution of the Kashmir issue; mounting Pakistan-Afghan tensions; controversial statements regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions; and an all-parties conference being held for what are meant to be non-party local polls, and that too with the full participation of the official Muslim League.

As if the tally was not long enough, Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri added yet another potentially inflammable issue to it. After the Sanaa conference of OIC foreign ministers, he stated his opposition to the OIC’s contemplated demand for a seat in the UNSC on the basis of religion. He said: “If Muslim countries demanded a permanent seat, others like Hindus and Jews would also ask for the same on similar grounds.”

India is already pressing hard for a permanent seat and may well get it. It should not be hard to imagine the OIC’s adverse reaction to Pakistan’s dissenting note.

Near home catastrophic floods in the NWFP, Punjab and parts of upper Sindh together with the Internet disruption underscore our inadequacy to cope with a sudden nationwide contingency. Might it not be important to examine and assess our resources and ability, moral and physical, in the environment of a possible armed conflict, nuclear or conventional?

Reverting to the Karachi gathering, yet another speaker, a national leader and a national hero at one time, tore the military high command to pieces for its gross, almost ludicrous, misconduct of the 1965 war. In his critique of the tank thrust on Amritsar via Khemkaran, he castigated the general staff for the operation (involving the bulk of our First Armoured Division) through an overwhelmingly untankable terrain.

The area beyond Khemkaran happens to be criss-crossed by canals to deny tanks the element of speed and manoeuvrability essential for the success of an armoured push. The enemy exploited the terrain to his best advantage by simply breaching the canals and flooding the area to drown practically a whole regiment of tanks.

The eminent speaker would have the audience believe that this happened because the general staff at the GHQ did not even have correct maps of the area.

The same maps, he said, were available and offered for as little as $20 in a foreign country where he happened to be at that time around. The story brought forth loud cheers from the audience.

Shouldn’t this sort of casual light- heartedness put us to thinking as to what we and our country are all about?

Are we a dying country or a failed state? A horrifying question to answer either way. What’s even more horrifying is the seeming acceptance of the hypothesis by many. — The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

Thursday, July 21, 2005

Where is foreign aid going?

Daily Times, July 22, 2005
"50% state-run schools have no basic facilities"
By Irfan Ghauri

ISLAMABAD: Of 135,365 state-run primary schools across the country, 50 percent have no drinking water, lavatories and boundary walls while 73 percent have no electricity, said a study report on the state of children’s education in Pakistan.

Save the Children UK, Pakistan Programme Office conducted the study. The report said that 30 percent middle schools were without water and washrooms while 40 percent were without electricity and boundary walls. Teacher absenteeism was a key factor behind low enrolment and a high dropout rate.

The study suggested that gender disparity in terms of access to basic education was still wide enough and Pakistan was unlikely to meet the millennium development goals. The data compiled by the Federal Bureau of Statistics shows that during 2001-2003, female enrolment increased by nine percent compared to 4.48 male enrolment, female enrolment for middle classes increased by 6.59 percent compared to 2.73 percent male enrolment.

The economic survey data showed that during 2001-2004, combined private primary enrolment increased by 6.36 percent for girls and 3.56 percent for boys.

Pakistan had a net primary enrolment ratio of 76 percent for males and 57 percent for females during 1998-2002. This amounts to a total of 12 million children in schools out of a total population of 20 million from 5 to 9 years old, based on a rough assessment and given the fact that only 20 percent births are registered in Pakistan. According to government targets, total primary enrolment should be 19.5 million by 2010.

According to various estimates there was a 50 to 70 percent dropout in the first five years of schooling.

Between 2001 and 2003, primary enrolment increased by 6.33 percent, middle by 4.22 percent and secondary by 2.12 percent. The economic survey data reports 17.41 million combined public and private primary enrolments. Interviews and field surveys confirmed an increase in the enrolment trend in recent years, especially among girls, report added.

Incentive packages for private sector, targeting rural areas has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of the private educational institutions. The last private school survey (FBS 2001) found a total of 36,096 private schools in Pakistan. The private sector investment in education was 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Wednesday, July 20, 2005

Interview of Indian Prime Minister in the US - clear headed and straight forward

The Washington Post
Interview: Indian Prime Minister Singh
Wednesday, July 20, 2005

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached an historic accord earlier this week with President Bush that will allow his country to buy billions of dollars worth of military hardware and sensitive nuclear technology long denied because of India's nuclear weapons program.

The broad agreement is a significant victory for the world's largest democracy, which built its nuclear program in secret in the early 1970s, and it cements New Delhi's role as a key strategic U.S. ally in Asia for decades to come.

In a wide-ranging breakfast interview with Washington Post editors and writers Wednesday, Singh discussed the impact of the deal for India and it's nuclear program. He also spoke about other issues facing his country, including relations with rival Pakistan, terrorism, regional security and the India's growing economic prowess.

Here are some excerpts from that interview:

Washington Post: With the new special relationship between the United States and India, do you think that your country can use this new relationship in helping the United States on relations with Iran?

Singh: We are entirely one with the rest of the world, that countries which take solemn international obligations, that they must honor those obligations. So we would like Iran, for example, to honor its obligations. . . . Our interest would be to work with other like-minded countries that a constructive solution can be found for the problems that Iran is expressing, that the world community is expressing about Iran. We have strong civilizational links with Iran. Also I would say Iran is the largest Shia Muslim country in the world. We have the second largest Shia Muslim population in our country . . . and I do believe that part of our unique history we can be a bridge.

Washington Post: Can you discuss India's discussions with building a gas pipeline with Iran?

Singh: As far as the pipeline is concerned, only preliminary discussions have taken place. We are terribly short of our energy supply and we desperately need new sources of energy. And that's why with Pakistan we have agreed to explore the possibility of the pipeline. But I am realistic enough to realize that there are many risks, because considering all the uncertainties of the situation there in Iran. I don't know if any international consortium of bankers would probably underwrite this. But we are in a state of preliminary negotiations, and the background of this is we desperately need the supply of gas that Iran has.

Washington Post: Following the announcement of the proposed nuclear technology agreement with the United States, can you discuss the issue of nuclear proliferation? Many people in the United States are concerned about this.

Singh: . . . Our peaceful nuclear program . . . was not built up by stealing other people's technology.

We had this dream that it was better to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons and we had this dream of universal nuclear disarmament. . . . We have been proved wrong and the result is we have seen in our neighborhood reckless proliferation in disregard of all the international obligations. But although we have nuclear assets, our program is totally under civilian control. We are a democracy, there are enough checks and balances in our country and we have an impeccable record of not contributing in any way to nuclear proliferation. . . .

Washington Post: If Pakistan asks for a similar agreement, do you expect the United States to say no?

Singh: Well, that's a decision the United States has to make, but quite frankly, the state of Pakistan currently -- I wish President Musharraf well, we want to work with him to bring greater balance in our own relations. But I have to be realistic enough to recognize the role that terrorist elements have played in the last few years in the history of Pakistan. Taliban was the creation of Pakistan extremists, the Wahabi Islam which has flourished, thousands and thousands of schools, the madrassas, were set up to preach this jihad based on hatred of other religions . . . and Pakistan is not a democracy in the sense that we know and you know. . . . We wish Pakistan success in emerging as a moderate Muslim state. We will work with President Musharraf . . . but we have to recognize what has happened.

Sunday, July 17, 2005

Observer: The Violence that lies in every ideology

Sunday July 17, 2005
The Observer
The violence that lies in every ideology

Like most beliefs, Islam is a religion of peace that has to accept that it can also breed terror

Jason Burke

The two young men, both clean-cut in neat trousers and well-ironed shirts, both studying computer science at a university in Pakistan, their homeland, have, perhaps unsurprisingly, the same views about their religion and its relation to the events of 7 July. 'Islam is a religion of peace and no one who does this is a true Muslim,' they say.
Then they start talking about civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq: 'Every action has a reaction. An action against Muslims causes a reaction by Muslims such as this. This is not unjustified.' There is a pause as we all consider the patent contradiction in their responses. 'Anyway,' they say almost together, 'it was probably the Americans or the Israelis.'

Such ludicrous conspiracy theories surfaced after 11 September and, on the evidence of the letters pages of many newspapers in the Middle East and south-west Asia, have once again. Quite apart from the xenophobia and racism, such ideas are rooted in a simple evasion. The unpleasant truth is that there are considerable elements within Islam that are very useful to violent militants. As a result, Islam is an integral part of the threat we now face. This is difficult for a non-Muslim to state, and leaves me open to accusations of Islamophobia, but is true. And it needs to be admitted and discussed, not swept under a carpet by a politically correct broom.
It is interesting to compare the statements of many of our politicians and community leaders with those of opinion-makers overseas. I am writing this in Pakistan, the world's second biggest Islamic nation. Alongside the letters implying that 7/7 was the work of Mossad, there have been a number of articles which contrast starkly with the continuous mantra heard so often recently.

'It is no use saying that Islam is a religion of peace or that there is a foul plot afoot to blacken its name when from Bali to Madrid to London it is Muslims who are behind acts of terrorism,' said Ayaz Amir in Dawn, a Karachi newspaper. 'To outsiders, a religion is known by the fruits it produces and if the present brand of terrorism has a Muslim substance it becomes difficult to sell the true meaning of Islam.' President Pervez Musharraf, the ruler of Pakistan, made exactly the same point in the summer of 2001. 'How does the world see us?' he asked. 'As hypocrites and terrorists.'

Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, but it is a religion of many other things, too. Compare the following two quotes from the Koran: 'There shall be no compulsion in religion' and: 'Slay the unbeliever ... wherever you find him.' Throughout its existence, Islam has evolved into a repository of a vast range of different resources, allowing its texts to be interpreted, sampled and deployed in myriad ways. When the Muslims were a persecuted minority in 7th-century Mecca, the stress lay on tolerance and pluralism.

When the Abbassid and Ummayad empires went to war a few centuries later, the more belligerent elements within the Koran provided justification for what were basically campaigns for land and booty. When Baghdad was conquered by the Mongols in 1258, Ibn Taimiya, a radical thinker often quoted by today's extremists, called on the world's Muslims to go 'back to basics' to restore their former strength.

The paradigm of Mohammed the prophet and his vastly outnumbered band of men triumphing over Evil has provided Muslims with succour and strength throughout the ages. This has particularly been the case when a powerful external threat has developed, such as when the West aggressively and violently conquered and colonised pretty much the entire Islamic world in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The very practical nature of Islam, a religion that enjoins the faithful to act in the world to change it, is also a boon to activists, good and bad, as does its emphasis on public demonstration of faith. The sight of rows of believers facing Mecca to answer the call to prayer often moves me, an atheist, deeply. Yet the Arabic word for martyr - and currently suicide bomber - comes from the same linguistic stem as the word for bearing witness.

The mindset of the Leeds suicide bombers is clear. They saw themselves not as British citizens but as defenders of a global Muslim community threatened by an aggressive and brutal foe. They felt themselves to be at war. Their enemy was the whole construct that is Western modernity, with all its power, temptations and confidence. Their victims were not civilians, but enemy combatants. Identity issues, frustration, anger, a sense of injustice, alienation ... all may have motivated the four bombers. But it was resources within Islam that underpinned their sense that their acts were justified.

Yet before we embark on a round of religious finger-pointing, we should note that all major faiths are the same. They can all offer help for different needs and agendas. Think of the muscular Christianity of imperialist, Victorian Britain (or, indeed, of contemporary America) or Hinduism's lunatic fringe. In Sri Lanka, even smiley, happy Buddhism has exacerbated one of the most vicious civil conflicts of our time.

In the Lebanese war of the early Eighties, more than 70 per cent of the suicide bombers came from Christian secular groups. And, before being outraged by the more belligerent quotes from the Koran, we should examine the words of many hymns currently sung in British schools, considerable portions of the Old Testament or the religious references made by extreme Israeli settlers. The English word 'martyr' derives from the word for witness, too, except that it is the Greek rather than the Arabic word. We have our own tradition of spectacular demonstrations of faith.

The logic can be extended to secular religions. Marxism, which had as many prophets, dogmas, rituals and myths as any more traditional faith, provided a deterministic explanation for all the wrongs in the world and set out a clear and cogent programme of action for how to set it right. Radical Islam does something similar. When we analysed the leftist violence of the Seventies or Eighties, we neither parroted that Marxist thought was 'dedicated to the human happiness and peace', though it theoretically was, nor did we dismiss it as inherently evil and the product of a diseased civilisation or race. We recognised that within leftist thought, there were elements that, if deployed properly, facilitated violent action and, if committed to non-violent means, discussed how best to counter them.

The debate over these issues has been continuing since Mohammed first began preaching his essential message of justice and social reform in the 7th century. The best thing non-Muslims can do is to avoid doing anything that makes the moderates' job harder, such as invading Muslim countries on what turn out to be completely spurious pretexts or making inflammatory Islamophobic comments. We also need to recognise the way our own faiths and ideologies can lead to violent action.

But Muslims need to recognise this as well. It needs to be said, loud and clear, that it was not the CIA or Mossad who brought down the Twin Towers and bombed the tube but Muslims. We need to be clear that, like any faith, Islam is a religion of peace - and sometimes of violence.

Jihadi Madrassas still operating.. almost freely

Daily Times, July 18, 2005
Jihadi madrassas alive and well

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A World Bank study that found the number of “jihadi” madrassas in Pakistan much smaller than popularly believed has been questioned by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based humanitarian outfit.

In an article in the Sunday edition of Washington Post, Samina Ahmed, the Group’s South Asia project director and Andrew Stroehlein, its media director, claim that “Jihadi extremism is still propagated at radical madrassas in Pakistan” and that “these religious schools still preach an insidious doctrine that foments the sectarian violence that is increasingly a threat to the stability of Pakistan.” In a reference to the London bombings, they observe, “And now, it seems, the hatred these madrassas breed is spilling blood in Western cities as well.”

They maintain that President Pervez Musharraf’s promises “came to nothing” as his government never implemented any programme to register the madrassas, follow their financing or control their curricula. Although there are a few “model madrassas” for “Western media consumption,” the extremist ones account for perhaps as many as 15 percent of the religious schools in Pakistan and are “free to churn out their radicalised graduates.” They add, “For those in the West who believed President Pervez Musharraf’s promises to clean up the militant religious schools, it is time to think again.”

Noting that the madrassa bomber Shehzad Tanweer attended a madrassa run by Lashkar-i-Taiba in Lahore for four months, the madrassa and the organisation operate freely despite an official ban on their activity since 2002. After 9/11, the authors argue, Gen Musharraf “clearly felt the pressure to be seen as doing something, and in January 2002 he gave a televised speech promising a series of measures to combat extremism by, among other things, bringing all madrassas into the mainstream.”

According to the authors, “Musharraf pledged increased oversight of the religious schools through formal registration, control of their funding and standardisation of their curricula. The world welcomed those promises, but few then checked back to see if they were ever fulfilled. A conventional wisdom developed, especially in the United States, that Musharraf was doing all he could to help fight terrorism - Musharraf even became something of a media hero, our brave ally in the war on terrorism. The view that all is well with Pakistan has been bolstered most recently by a World Bank-funded report claiming, against other available evidence, that the country’s madrassa sector is smaller than previously estimated and suggesting that the religious schools pose no serious threat. London on 7/7 shows that analysis was deadly wrong.”

Ahmed and Stroehlein write that Lashkar-i-Taiba is an excellent example of how the Musharraf government has failed to curb extremist religious militants. Though formally banned in 2002, Lashkar-i-Taiba has renamed itself Jamaatud Dawa and continued its activities, including the promotion of jihad in Kashmir, where it has openly claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks, they state. They also point out that Lashkar leader Hafiz Sayeed was temporarily detained, but only under Pakistan’s Maintenance of Public Order legislation, not its much more stringent Anti-Terrorism Act. His detention was short. Prominent figures from this and other formally banned groups such as Sipah-i-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed appear to enjoy “virtual immunity from the law,” they add.

The article claims that the fact that Gen Musharraf has not acted against religious extremists and their madrassas is “hardly surprising” as he needs the religious parties to “bolster his military dictatorship against the democratic forces seeking to reverse his 1999 coup.” They go on to argue that the “radicals maintain their avenues for propagating their militant ideas, because the chief patrons of jihad, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Islami political parties, have acquired prominent and powerful roles in Musharraf’s political structure.” While the authors concede that the Musharraf government has captured or killed some 600 Al Qaeda members since 2001, they are of the view that the madrassas are churning out as many radicals as are being apprehended.

Human Rights situation in India....

Boston Globe
The legacy of India's counter-terrorism
By Jaskaran Kaur | July 17, 2005

WHEN INDIAN Prime Minister Manmohan Singh meets with President Bush in Washington this week on his first official visit, and the first of an Indian head of state since 9/11, he will be reaffirming a strategic partnership. Prime Minister Singh will address a joint session of Congress on Tuesday, and terrorism is high on the agenda. An item not likely on the agenda is India's systematic abuse of human rights in the name of counter-terrorism. Despite receiving praise as the world's largest democracy, India's human rights record falls dismally behind countries that have only recently shed their legacy of dictatorships.

From 1984-95, Indian security forces tortured, ''disappeared," killed, and illegally cremated more than 10,000 Punjabi Sikhs in counter-insurgency operations. Many perpetrators of these abuses are now championed as counter-terrorism experts. Most prominent among them is former Punjab director general of police and campaign architect K.P.S. Gill, whose policies, according to Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, ''appeared to justify any and all means, including torture and murder." Hailed as a super cop, Gill now heads an Indian counter-terrorism institute.

Four years ago, I criss-crossed Punjab and documented the impact of impunity for abuses committed by security forces. I sat on jute cots in poor farming houses talking with survivors struggling to rebuild their lives and sipped tea in the guarded mansions of judges. A senior high court judge, who addressed me as a naĆÆve daughter, pointedly told me that fundamental rights did not exist during an insurgency.

One afternoon, I spoke with Jaswinder Singh. He was in his 20s. In 1992, Punjab police officers repeatedly subjected Jaswinder to electric shocks, stretched his legs apart at the waist until his thigh muscles ruptured, and suspended him upside down from the ceiling, while beating him with rods. Subsequently, the police ''disappeared" his brother, father, and grandfather. Jaswinder unsuccessfully pursued his family's disappearance to the Supreme Court. But he had no time for grief; the loss of his family's breadwinners meant he had to support the survivors, despite continued police harassment.

A flickering hope of justice remains for survivors of the counter-insurgency abuses. Since December 1996, the Committee for Information and Initiative in Punjab has struggled before the Indian National Human Rights Commission in a landmark lawsuit addressing police abductions that led to mass cremations, including those of Jaswinder's family. The commission, acting as a body of the Indian Supreme Court, has the authority to remedy violations of fundamental rights in this historic case of mass crimes. Its decisions will serve as precedent for victims of state-sponsored abuses throughout India. The commission has received over 3,500 claims from Amritsar alone, one of 17 districts in Punjab.

During the past eight years, however, the commission has not heard testimony from a single survivor. Guatemala's Historical Clarification Commission registered 42,275 victims in 18 months. El Salvador's Commission on the Truth collected information on 22,000 victims in eight months. The Indian Commission, however, has kept survivors running in circles, limiting its inquiry to one of 17 districts in Punjab.

A few weeks ago, the commission drastically narrowed its mandate, stating its plan to resolve the case by determining only whether police had properly cremated victims -- not whether the police had wrongfully killed them in the first place. With this move, the commission rejected the victims' right to life and endorsed the Indian government's position that life is expendable during times of insurgency.

India's counter-terrorism practices have left a legacy of broken families, rampant police abuse, and a judicial system unwilling to enforce fundamental rights. As India ignores its past, it continues to employ the same Draconian measures in places such as Kashmir. While Prime Minister Singh extols India as a leading democracy, the international community must weigh the devastation and insecurity wrought by a national security policy based on systematic human rights abuses and impunity.

In 1997, Ajaib Singh committed suicide after the Punjab police tortured and disappeared his son and justice failed him. His suicide note read: ''Self-annihilation is the only way out of a tyranny that leaves no chance for justice." If India fails to address its own mass atrocities, this should raise serious questions about its role as a partner in the ''war on terror."

Jaskaran Kaur is co-founder and executive director of ENSAAF, a nonprofit organization fighting impunity in India.

© Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company