Preserving Coalition Government Key to U.S. Objectives in Pakistan: Lisa Curtis

Preserving Coalition Government Key to U.S. Objectives in Pakistan
by Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #1935, May 21, 2008

A power struggle is underway between Pakistan People's Party (PPP) co-chairman (and widower of Benazir Bhutto) Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz (PML/N) leader Nawaz Sharif, and President Pervez Musharraf. This struggle threatens to unravel the newly elected coalition government and plunge Pakistan back into political chaos.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani is desperately trying to maintain the integrity of Pakistan's coalition government. Zardari and Sharif have failed to agree on a formula to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last November, and as a consequence, nine PML/N ministers have submitted their resignations, which the Prime Minister has refused to accept.

The U.S. should support Gillani's efforts to keep the coalition intact, which involves fulfilling election promises, including the reinstatement of deposed judges. Continued cooperation between the PPP and the PML/N is the best hope for stabilizing Pakistan as it copes with economic and terrorism challenges that threaten further political unrest.

Building on Election Success

Pakistanis largely greeted the February 18 elections that brought the coalition government to power with jubilation. The elections were viewed as an indictment of Musharraf's policies, particularly his crackdown on civil society following the November 3, 2007, emergency decree during which the Supreme Court bench was dismissed, judges and political activists were jailed, and the press was stifled. As part of their agreement to rule in coalition, Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif agreed to restore the deposed judges by April 30.

Pakistanis are therefore confused by the PPP's backtracking on restoring the judges. There is a perception that the party is under U.S. pressure to avoid steps that might threaten President Musharraf's hold on power.

The resignation of nine PML/N ministers represents a tremendous loss for the coalition government. Their departure will degrade its ability to deal with the economic, energy, and terrorism crises facing the country. Pakistan currently faces power outages lasting six–eight hours per day throughout the country and spiking food prices that threaten to bring people into the streets. No party can handle these challenges alone. Maintaining the "grand alliance" of the strongest political parties will prevent Pakistan from sliding back toward political unrest.

Firefighting Against Militants in the Northwest

The most dangerous development in Pakistan is the advance of Taliban-backed militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and some of the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The new civilian government, in tandem with the Army, is pursuing negotiations with hard-core militants. Among them is Baitullah Mahsud, who is accused of masterminding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and several other suicide bombings throughout the country.

The government hopes that negotiations will separate tribal leaders from the extremists and encourage them to turn against the terrorists. The problem is that the tribal leaders don't have the wherewithal to confront the extremists, and the negotiations so far only seem to have strengthened the radicals in the region.

The Pakistani government says that it needs time for the negotiations to bear fruit and is ready to back the negotiations with force if necessary. The danger lies in promoting a negotiating process that legitimizes the extremists and increases their influence.

There are signs that this is already happening. Media reports indicate that the Pakistani government has agreed to allow Taliban-backed militants to establish Shariah law in Malakand Division, which would essentially block the people of this region from appealing the decisions of the Shariat Court to the Peshawar High Court or the Pakistani Supreme Court. It appears that the government may be negotiating away the people's rights despite the fact that religious parties suffered a major electoral defeat in the NWFP. Allowing Taliban-backed militants to demand political changes through force undermines the legitimacy of the elected government and will be viewed by the militants as a victory in their efforts to turn Pakistan into a Taliban-like state.

NATO commanders signaled their concern about the negotiations last week and noted that increased attacks in eastern Afghanistan—up 50 percent from the same time last year—were due partly to insurgents' ability to find safe haven in Pakistan's border areas.

Awareness among Pakistanis about the terrorist threat from the tribal border areas is increasing. Pakistanis are beginning to understand that the Taliban-backed elements are competing for political power with the Pakistani state. Some even acknowledge that the battle between Pakistani authorities and the violent extremists in the border areas is pivotal to the future of the province, if not to the future of Pakistan itself.

Strategic Approach Needed

Instead of engaging in tactical negotiations to buy time, Pakistan needs to develop a strategic approach to dealing with the Tribal Areas that is closely coordinated with and supported by the U.S. Islamabad and Washington must develop a strategy that relies on economic, political, and military tools to undermine the terrorists in the region.

In addition to implementing large-scale economic development programs in the FATA, the U.S. should move forward expeditiously on Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation that was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 13, 2008. The ROZs are meant to encourage investment in and around underdeveloped tribal areas by permitting certain products produced there to enter the U.S. duty-free. Delays in moving ahead with this initiative in the U.S. are creating mistrust in Pakistan about U.S. commitment and undermining the broader U.S. objective of winning hearts and minds through social uplift programs.

The U.S. should also support efforts to bring political reform to the FATA, including incorporation of the region into Pakistan proper in order to increase government writ in the areas. The leadership of the PPP and Awami National Party (ANP), currently ruling the NWFP, supports implementing the Political Parties Act in the FATA, which would extend Pakistani election laws to the region and encourage political activity. Political parties are currently prohibited from operating in the FATA, and a political agent, or federal bureaucrat, runs the affairs of each of the seven FATA agencies. There are 12 seats reserved for FATA members in the National Assembly and eight in the Senate. However, parliament has no authority to legislate on matters concerning FATA, and the FATA legislators wield little authori­ty.

Finally, the U.S. should speed up plans to provide counterinsurgency training to Pakistani paramilitary troops stationed in the FATA. The training of Pakistan's Frontier Corps is scheduled to begin this summer, but it should have started long ago. Washington must encourage Pakistani security forces to remain on the offensive in the border areas until the terrorist threat dissipates. The alternative—relying solely on American military action in the FATA—risks destabilizing Pakistani politics in favor of the extremists and could leave the U.S. facing a far larger terrorist threat in Pakistan than it faces today.

Conclusion

The political maneuvering in Islamabad over the deposed judges is distracting the Pakistani government from dealing with the grave challenges facing the country, especially the burgeoning Taliban threat in the Northwest.

President George W. Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Gillani on Sunday in Egypt during the World Economic Forum highlighted U.S. support for the new democratically elected civilian government. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently noted that the "absence of freedom is one of the conditions that produces terrorism" and that Pakistan's transition to democracy "could not be more affirming of everything that President Bush believes about the power of democracy, the power of those principles, and their power to defeat terrorism long term." Now that the new government is facing challenges in its transition to democracy, Washington can best support Gillani's efforts to keep the coalition together by allowing him to fulfill the government's election promises, including reinstatement of the deposed judges.

Washington also must level with Pakistani civilian and military leaders on its concerns over the government's approach to the rising terrorist threat in the northwest border areas. Washington should emphasize that it stands ready to assist Pakistan in its fight against the terrorists as long as the government avoids negotiations that strengthen the Taliban's ability to conduct attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan and/or al-Qaeda's ability to project terrorism throughout the world.

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Energy band-aids

Energy band-aids — Robert M Hathaway & Michael Kugelman
Daily Times, May 21, 2008

The federal cabinet’s announcement last week of new energy conservation measures is a welcome recognition of the urgency of the country’s energy crisis. But Pakistanis should not fool themselves. Closing markets early and moving the clocks forward won’t fire many boilers or cool many homes this summer.

Pakistan will not be able to attain and sustain substantial economic growth in the absence of affordable and secure supplies of energy. Neither Pakistanis nor their governments have adequately focused on this inevitable and unbreakable linkage.

Fortunately, widespread agreement already exists on at least the broad outlines of what Pakistan must do in order to meet its energy needs. Indeed, both the previous government and the current one have taken modest steps to rationalise the country’s energy policies. But what has been lacking is a comprehensive strategy, reflecting the multitude of ways in which decisions in the energy sector impact the lives of Pakistanis.

Such a strategy would incorporate, at a minimum, the following elements:

Pakistan derives nearly 80 percent of its energy from natural gas and (largely imported) oil. Coal and hydro, on the other hand, though potentially plentiful, are under-utilised. The current disproportionate reliance on natural gas and oil is simply unsustainable. Pakistan must move toward a meaningful diversification of its energy mix.

The institutional fragmentation of the energy sector has produced a haphazard approach to energy planning and implementation, notable primarily for a lack of coordination and communication among the various government ministries and bureaus with an energy responsibility. Existing ad hoc interagency bodies have failed to override bureaucratic and organisational rivalries or give Pakistan a coherent energy policy. One solution — there are others — would be to bring the various components of the government that deal with energy into a single ministry. If this is not feasible, then Islamabad should at least create a mechanism for better coordination of planning, decision-making, and implementation.

The government ought to accelerate its privatisation programme. The private sector has the ability to mobilise capital and share risk, and can provide both operational efficiencies and new technologies. Past governments have paid lip service to privatisation, but these efforts have frequently been halting and erratic. Now is the moment to move forward with new vigour and resolve.

Economic growth is important, but it is not the only top-tier priority facing Pakistani decision-makers. In designing its energy policy, the government must not lose sight of other priorities, such as equitable development and poverty reduction. Development and the raising of living standards for Pakistan’s people must be full-fledged components of a comprehensive energy strategy, even if this complicates the task of the country’s energy planners.

An energy strategy worthy of its name will recognise that energy has important social, environmental, and human development implications. If energy planning is to be comprehensive, representatives from all important social groups in Pakistani society must have a voice in the fashioning and implementation of the country’s energy policies. Energy policy must be far more inclusive than it has historically been.

Those responsible for Pakistan’s energy policies must acknowledge the links between energy and gender. A lack of access to modern sources of energy reinforces Pakistan’s gender divides and contributes to the continued marginalisation of women, especially rural women. Social scientists agree that a country will find it exceedingly difficult to modernise so long as its women confront social, economic, and legal inequities. But if energy must be an integral component of Pakistan’s modernisation strategy, gender issues must be an integral component of the country’s energy strategy.

Pakistan must expand its sources and supplies of renewable energy. For starters, in calculating the relative cost of various forms of energy, Pakistanis must consider the full social costs of carbon emissions produced by conventional energy sources; to do otherwise places renewable energy on a seriously tilted playing field. A comprehensive energy strategy must also finance investment in renewable energy technologies and support the creation of technology institutes and research centres.

If increasing supply is one-half of the energy equation, reducing the growth of demand is the other. One of the best ways to reduce demand is through greater energy efficiency. While any efficiency strategy must emphasise conservation, infrastructure improvements will be equally key. Inadequate or antiquated infrastructure is a major problem in Pakistan; by some estimates, poor infrastructure results in a 30 percent loss of transmission annually. A nationwide audit of current inefficiencies would constitute a good first step in combating the extraordinary inefficiencies of the present system.

Several of Pakistan’s closest neighbours have developed promising business models that might be applicable in Pakistan. Nepal has successfully commercialised household biogas plants. Bangladesh and India have adopted successful rural electrification schemes that give customers a voice and a stake in decisions affecting them. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh offer attractive examples of the commercialisation of solar home systems. Pakistan’s energy planners should not hesitate to borrow from the successes of other countries.

Throughout Pakistan’s history, implementation has never matched ambition; political will has been in short supply. And this gets to the heart of the matter — the need for Pakistan’s leaders to adopt a long-term perspective and to make politically difficult decisions, even at the cost of angering constituents. Islamabad, for instance, should adopt an energy pricing system that more closely reflects the true cost of energy (except, perhaps, for its poorest citizens), rather than using subsidies and other mechanisms to shield the consumer from paying internationally determined fuel tariffs. The government must also move forcefully against power theft — another step that will not be popular with many Pakistanis. Losses due to illegal connections, meter tampering, and other forms of theft may total Rs 25 billion per year. At the same time, however, policymakers must not forget their other obligations, such as poverty reduction and the provision of a social safety net to the country’s least well off. Wisely balancing these competing priorities will itself require political courage.

Pakistan’s energy situation is seriously troubling today, but absent careful planning and implementation, it will get far worse in the years ahead. The country does not have the luxury of further dawdling. Band-aids and ad hoc measures will not suffice. The cost of inaction, of further muddling through, is both great and growing.

Robert M Hathaway is Asia Programme director, and Michael Kugelman a programme associate, at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. They are co-editors of the forthcoming Powering Pakistan: Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 21st Century.

Who really is negotiating these deals?

‘ANP not taken on board in talks with FATA militants’
* Party leader says reservations remain over direct talks between federal govt, FATA militants
By Akhtar Amin, Daily Times, May 21, 2008

PESHAWAR: The federal government has not taken the Awami National Party (ANP) on board in talks with militants in the Tribal Areas, ANP Senior Vice President Senator Haji Muhammad Adeel said on Tuesday.

Talking to reporters at the Peshawar Press Club, Adeel said the ANP leadership had forwarded the reservations it had over the federal government’s direct talks with tribal militants. He said the party was not taken into confidence over the military operation against local Taliban in Darra Adam Khel a week ago.

He said that such military operations could derail the NWFP government’s peace negotiations with the Taliban in Swat. Being a coalition partner in the NWFP and federal governments, the ANP should be taken on board during talks with the tribal militants, Adeel said.

He said the tribal people were Pashtun and that the ANP could play a vital role in reaching a peace agreement with the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

He said the ANP government had proved through its talks with the Swat militants that peace could be restored through negotiations and without the use of force.

However, he said that it was not easy to hold talks with the militants, as it could take some time to remove reservations and misconceptions on both sides.

Ex-generals plan long march

Ex-generals plan long march, sit-in at Army House By Rauf Klasra
The News, May 20, 2008

ISLAMABAD: Retired Army generals, including some who trained and groomed Pervez Musharraf, have planned a long march and a sit-in before the Army House in Rawalpindi to get it vacated so that Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani could move in.

The long march, the date of which will be announced soon, is being given final touches. The procession to force Musharraf to vacate the Army House would be led by former Army chief Mirza Aslam Beg and General (retd) Hamid Gul and about 200 retired Army officers will be there.

The presence of General (retd) Ali Quli Khan in the rally would be watched with a lot of interest by many as he was not only the course mate of Musharraf, but once the main candidate for the slot of Chief of Army staff.

Ali Quli had fallen victim to palace intrigues as Nawaz Sharif’s personal bias against him had helped Musharraf to capture the top slot. Another ex-Army general, General (retd) Faiz Chishti has been actively putting pressure on Musharraf to quit the post of Army Chief.

Talking to The News, Brig (retd) Mian Mohammad Mahmud, who is from the first PMA and an organiser of the event, confirmed that the top retired Army generals had decided to stage the long march. Brig Mahmud said efforts are under way to bring maximum number of Army generals in the demonstration as this issue concerns the reputation of the Pakistan Army.

Meanwhile, Brig Mahmud also handed over a statement on behalf of ex-Army servicemen. The statement said the common man’s urgent problems need to be addressed immediately. To examine the vital issues, a meeting of all like-minded and patriotic ex-servicemen is being called shortly, it said. A date will be announced soon, it said.

The Future of Peace Deals?

The fate of Swat
By Khadim Hussain, Dawn, May 20, 2008

ACCORDING to press reports, the government is mulling over the promulgation of an ordinance — the Sharia Nizam-i-Adl Ordinance 2008 — in Malakand division. This may bring about drastic changes in the judicial system in Swat, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Buner, Shangla and Chitral.

The draft ordinance proposes ‘muaavin qazis’, selected from the clergy of the area, who would assist the civil courts in deciding cases according to the ‘tenets of the Quran and Sunnah’.

District and sessions judges, according to the draft, would be called ‘zilla qazis’, additional sessions judges ‘izafi zilla qazis’ and senior civil judges would be ‘aala qazis’. The advice of the ‘muaavin qazi’ would be binding on the courts. Appeal against a judgment would not be made in the Peshawar High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Instead, an appellate Sharia court would be established at the divisional level. The said ordinance was first promulgated in 1995 after the stand-off between the security forces and the defunct Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), revised again in 1999 and now — for the third time — being promulgated in 2008.

It seems that the hardliner TNSM under Fazlullah has put forward two major demands during recent talks after government circles announced a ‘breakthrough’.

The first demand seems to be the withdrawal of troops and the second the promulgation of the said ordinance. The other demands include compensation for the dead, allowance for carrying weapons and release of arrested so-called militants. Intriguingly, the ‘breakthrough’ might easily be gauged by the unabated targeted acts of the militants who have allegedly shot dead a pesh imam, picked up another person from his home and lately marched in the streets in the restive parts of the Swat valley.

Ironically, the people of Malakand division voted for secular and liberal parties in the hope that the influence of the clergy would diminish if these parties were elected because the MMA government had previously allowed these outfits to grow and become strong. Those who know Swat (and Malakand division) would bear witness to the fact that an overwhelming majority of the people of the area never supported the clergy in their quest for sweeping influence in the valley and its surrounding areas. The government seems to have acquiesced in to the demand of the armed militants in its attempt to strike a peace bargain in the area. There are several shortcomings in this approach.

Firstly, the situation in Swat (Buner and Shangla) is peculiarly different from the situation in the tribal areas. The people of Swat formed and ran a state long before Pakistan came into being and have a surprisingly mature attitude to the state and its institutions. They would not like to be treated in a manner that is discriminatory vis-à-vis the rest of the country. Bringing peace in this manner might lead to a wave of restlessness and despondency among the people. This in turn could result in civil war and warlordism.

Secondly, the ordinance, even if we assume that the people support the move, might practically impact, in a positive or negative way, on only one per cent of the people who are involved in litigation. The rest of the people in the valley and in the adjoining districts are probably more in need of comprehensive and holistic planning for participatory development than a misconceived interpretation of the Sharia.

Thirdly, the particular ideology of a minority group under the influence of the Wahabi version of Islam might hold the moderate and open people of Swat hostage without their consent. An ever-growing class of professionals, including urban businessmen all over Swat, might see the promulgation of a vague judicial system as a threat to their interests and worldview.

This might even prompt them to start migrating from the valley — probably from Malakand division itself — in large numbers, leaving a vacuum that may not be filled for decades to come. Different groups of civil society in Swat have already started expressing their concern about the recent developments in the valley in particular and Malakand division generally.

By acquiescing in to the demands of the militants for the promulgation of the Sharia Nizam-i-Adl Ordinance 2008 in the Swat valley and other parts of Malakand division, the government has indicated that it might give larger space to the extremist minority there than what it deserves.

Some quarters have already started pointing to the future shape of the present developments. The militants might get emboldened to start intervening in the private affairs of the general population and take action such as banning television, closing down Internet cafes, shutting down girls’ schools, forcing barbers to stop their business and preventing anything that is modern to be accessed by the enlightened population of the valley. One may observe this phenomenon in the demand of the hardliner group led by Maulana Fazlullah that the land of the area be redistributed.

Where will the state stand? How will the ancient and rich culture of the Swat valley survive under these circumstances? How will those foreign powers who have fundamental interests in the region respond? How will the majority population respond to this move by the government? How can peace be ensured through the promulgation of a controversial judicial system?

Will the promulgation of this system solve the multitude of problems stemming from the actions of the groups presently engaged in a dialogue with the government? These questions are of immense importance for understanding the actual situation on the ground.

The immediate loss that the people of Malakand division in general and Swat in particular might incur would be the drying up of sources of income-generation through tourism-related activities. Probably, this season might see the closing down of thousands of hotels along the length and breadth of Swat, thus having a huge adverse economic effect on the lives of the people there. Probably more people than the number of individuals aligned with all militant groups put together will become jobless.

What is the alternative to such a situation? It would amount to leaving the jobless at the mercy of circumstances, and thus ensuring that far more militants would be roaming with their Kalashnikovs in the urban centres of the Swat valley than one can see at present. The long-term impact of the promulgation might be the depletion of natural resources, Talibanisation of the entire valley, warlordism, shrinking space for civil society and the stigmatisation of a whole culture.

The writer is coordinator, Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. khadim.2005@gmail.com

A war like no other!

A war like no other
By Ahmad Faruqui, Dawn, May 19, 2008

ACCORDING to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the US Congress, the threat of a large, ‘visually dramatic’ attack on American soil is still very much there, even after seven years of furious assaults by the US military on suspected terrorist targets. The GAO also says that the attack may be accompanied by large-scale economic aftershocks and fear in the population.

The CIA traces this threat largely to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, which have seen an intensification of violence during the last year. All of this doom and gloom stands in sharp contrast to the euphoria that broke out when the US deposed the Taliban in December 2001 and followed up by deposing Saddam Hussein in April 2003. For one brief moment, it looked like the scourge of terror had been put out of business.

The neoconservatives were imagining that the world was going to become a safer place under a Pax Americana. It is now May 2008 and the war on terror continues unabated, its early and dramatic victories but a distant memory. According to many western experts, the US and its allies may be on the verge of losing the war. How did this happen? Can anything be done about it?

Examining the first question, it is apparent that the war was poorly conceived and even more poorly executed, since it was based on false assumptions. First, that there was a finite pool of ‘bad guys’ who could be hammered into extinction. The enemy was largely invisible, melded in among the people and carried out its attacks in the shadows.

Second, that once the top leaders of Al Qaeda would be taken out, the rest of the organisation would shrivel up. Al Qaeda Central is on the run, most of its leaders are dead, its armies are outgunned and its loyal followers scattered to the four winds. But through a Darwinian process, it has given birth to a more sinister, hardened Al Qaeda Informal.

Its members are younger and westernised and therefore harder to detect. They have adapted their tactics to the new environment. They are in this fight for the long haul and have figured out that the way to win is by outlasting the foreign occupying forces. They live or die by Mao’s dictum, “The guerilla wins by not losing.”

And third, that this ‘war’ required conventional military intervention. The failure of this strategy is manifest in Fata. The US paid little attention to the educational and economic development of Fata, which only received four per cent of the US aid that came to Pakistan, with 96 per cent going to the military.

It is unfortunate that Washington chose to ignore the sage counsel that was given by Sir Michael Howard soon after the 9/11 attacks. The renowned military historian had written that the rhetoric and expectations of ‘war’ were counterproductive when dealing with terrorism since much military experience was irrelevant. Howard said the problem required skillful political management and patient police work, backed up where necessary by military force in aid of the civil power.

Just before the Iraq war, I argued in Security Dialogue, a European journal, that Washington needed to rethink the premises of its policy against terrorism. Like other criminal problems, terrorism had a supply side and a demand side. The Bush administration focused exclusively on the supply side, deploying military force to eliminate existing terrorist networks. This was an incomplete cure at best.

As Israel had discovered to its regret, killing terrorists will not eliminate terrorism. For every terrorist that is killed, several more are created. Without condoning terrorists or forgiving their heinous crimes, the plan should be to prevent future terrorists from being created.

Washington needs to rethink its policies in the region, since they are alienating large numbers of young people throughout the Muslim world and some are becoming terrorists. Both the strategy and tactics of the war have to be reinvented. Most importantly, a way has to be found to communicate with the terrorists. It may be impossible to speak in rational terms with the uberterrorists, but it is fairly probable that large numbers of their existing and future followers can be reached.

Political solutions have to be pioneered that would draw people away from a path where they are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to take the lives of others. Only then will the demand for terrorist acts diminish. Up to now, such views were widely regarded as heretical in the US by those who are managing the war on terror. However, they have just received a strong theoretical and empirical foundation in a new book by forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman Leaderless Jihad.

A former CIA employee, he has analysed the background of several hundred terrorists. Based on this empirical work, he argues that terrorists are not sociopaths but intelligent, goal-oriented people who are infused with a moral outrage stemming from either the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land or, more recently, the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Poverty and lack of opportunity are not necessarily the factors that drive young men to commit violence. Instead, it is the opportunity to sacrifice themselves for the sake of building a better world that ignites the fire inside their heart. They become convinced that blowing up people is the only way of drawing attention to the underlying injustices.

Thus, to answer the second question about how to fix the problem, the best way is to bring about genuine peace in the Palestinian territories and begin withdrawing immediately US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, depriving jihadis of their ability to wage a moral war. Sageman contends that the presence of even one American soldier trumps any goodwill policy the United States attempts to carry out in the Middle East.

He also recommends an end to the offering of rewards, to the publication of most-wanted lists and to the staging of press conferences that proclaim the capture of top terrorists. Jihadis regard all these as badges of honor. It would be better to treat terrorists like common criminals and give them minimal publicity.

Washington had gone tone deaf when Sir Michael said virtually the same thing in 2001. Perhaps the British accent got in the way. One hopes Sageman’s American voice will resonate better.

The writer is an associate with the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford.faruqui@pacbell.net

‘Pakistan Zindabad’

‘Pakistan Zindabad’ in Joburg
By Ghazi Salahuddin, The News, 5/18/2008

A hectic journey to a faraway place that extends to more than a week can hardly protect you from the sorrows of Pakistan, particularly when you are a newsman and addicted to keeping in touch with every day’s events. And this is certainly not a time when you can find yourself at peace with the emerging twists in what has become a political thriller.

Still, my visit to Johannesburg — also called Joburg for the benefit of headline writers — had its compelling distractions. I was attending this year’s International Public Television (Input) conference that showcased an extensive selection — over 100 programmes from 40 countries — of what is meant to be television in public interest. The idea was to present and discuss some innovative, challenging and provocative television productions from across the world.

Since I have recently been nominated the national coordinator of Input for Pakistan, I had this regret that there had not been enough time to present any Pakistani entries for this year’s selection. But imagine my surprise when I found, after arriving in Joburg, that a documentary from France was titled: ‘Pakistan Zindabad’. It did raise my spirits a bit and I waited to see what treatment was given to a 104-minute portrayal of the 60 years of Pakistan.

An important feature of Input is that no programme is screened unless its producer or director or someone closely associated with its production is present to join a discussion with the audience composed of media professionals, independent filmmakers, and critics. Incidentally, this scheme of discussing a programme after its screening was also followed in the two mini-Inputs held in Karachi last year and early this year with a joint collaboration of Geo Television and Goethe Institut. This is how I got involved in Input, courtesy Petra Raymond, the outgoing director of the Institut in Karachi.

Hence, Christine Camdessus was present when ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ was screened on May 7. Let me quickly state that I found the documentary to be an objective and insightful journey through Pakistan’s 60 years of otherwise very complex history. That it looked like a text-book lesson on Pakistan was very intentional. The motive for its production, as Christine Camdessus explained, was to provide a wider perspective on Pakistan’s genesis and evolution at a time when the country is so prominently featured in international headlines.

I do not have the space here to seriously review ‘Pakistan Zindabad’, with its emphasis that the creation of Pakistan was an important moment in history that is not fully understood. People interviewed for the documentary included such experts as Stephen Cohen, Ian Talbot, Steve Coll, Ayesha Jalal and Hassan Abbas. Besides, all the usual suspects were there —Roedad Khan, Hussain Haqqani, Aslam Beg, Hamid Gul, Sartaj Aziz, Jahangir Karamat, and so many more.

Some CIA operatives who were involved in Ziaul Haq’s jihad in Afghanistan were very candid in their remarks. I was a little amused by the attention devoted to the rich Texas socialite Joanne Herring, Zia’s friend. She found it necessary to say that she was never alone with Zia. This was the woman who figured in ‘Charlie Wilson’s War’ and her role was played by Julia Roberts. Incidentally, Aslam Beg, while criticising Ayub for his war plans in 1965, made this statement: “We could have won the war”.

Because the documentary was to be timed with the sixtieth anniversary of Pakistan’s creation, the Pakistan that has come into being after the lawyers’ movement and after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the February elections was, of course, not reflected in the documentary. The only major Pakistani leader interviewed was Benazir and the presenter explained that they had decided not to interview Musharraf or Nawaz Sharif. Benazir’s interview was taken when the documentary was almost complete.

Christine Camdessus was evidently very touched by Benazir’s assassination and said she was anxious to make a documentary on Benazir. The homework she has already done on Pakistan makes her the right person to interpret the apparently final phase of the Bhutto phenomenon for a world audience.

This reference to the documentary on Pakistan unfortunately allows little space to recount the overwhelming experience of Input 2008. When I look at what they call the ‘Input bible’, the book that lists the programmes, I can tick off more than a dozen presentations that I would want to talk about. One option would be to detect reflections of the current global political situation, ranging from terrorism and Islamic extremism to the Iraq war and the conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

On the first day of the week-long screenings was the Danish entry titled: ‘Two Men, Twelve Drawings’. It related to the rise of Islamophobia in Denmark after the publication of the blasphemous cartoons and covered two leaders of the Muslim community, one representing the liberal point of view and the other belonging to the conservative school of thought — and the two could not even be persuaded to meet each other.

Naturally, Input 2008 also became a Pan African affair and its main theme was ‘Back to the Beginning’. A seminar held on the sidelines of the conference was related to ‘Slavery, Memory & Story’. Indeed, the theme of slavery, with reference to the African experience, echoed throughout the week. There was a sizeable participation from South African filmmakers and their contribution to discussions on different programmes was quite impressive.

For me, the inaugural dinner in itself was an astounding encounter. Not only that the South African hosts surprised us with their lavish and colourful hospitality, the presence of Harry Belafonte, the popular singer of the sixties and the ‘King of Calypso’, made a lot of difference. Now 81 and a United Nations goodwill ambassador, Belafonte was also the keynote speaker at the launch, later in the week, of the Human Bondage Project — a global joint venture to produce within the next five years various documentaries, feature films and drama series on slavery.

Again, I am tempted to dwell on Belafonte, one of the most successful recording artists of all time. There was that song that I could never fully understand but it rings in my years: “Day O, Day O, daylight come and he wanna go home”. I cannot also forget his ‘Jamaican farewell’. Son of a Jamaican father, he was born in Harlem and had created headlines in early 2006 when he called Bush “the greatest terrorist in the world”.

Ah, the Joburg interlude, though it has left me with a hoard of memories, was brief and here I am back in the midst of confusion that Asif Zardari’s team has created on the issue of the restoration of the November 2 judiciary. Meanwhile, there is Salman Taseer — virtually a bugle that signals the coming Battle of Punjab. And this will be more than a television show.

The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@ hotmail.com

Whats Happening in Pakistan?: An Insightful Analysis

Capital suggestion - Game theory and the PPP Dr Farrukh Saleem
Daily Times, May 18, 2008

Pakistan's heptagonal (a polygon with seven sides) political game has seven major players: Pakistan Army, America, the PPP, the PML-N, the presidency, the media and civil society. Game theory, a branch of applied mathematics, also provides some serious applications in the field of political science. To begin with, game theory assumes that each of the seven players shall always act to maximize their individual gains by anticipating the responses to their actions by one or other players in the game. Game theory, having made that assumption, then proceeds to "mathematically capture behaviour" of players in the game.

The Pakistan Army, for instance, having dominated Pakistan's politics — and thus economics — is in the game to preserve its domination. America's foreign policy is strictly based on realism, devoid of any moral or ethical dimension. America's interest in this country revolves around the 'war on terror' and nuclear non-proliferation. As a consequence, the Pakistan Army and Uncle Sam are natural allies.

On November 28, 2007, the presidency's de facto powers were no more. In the immediate future, the PPP and the PML-N, in order to maximize their own gains, shall snatch away the bulk of presidency's de jure powers.

The Bush-Musharraf nexus can deliver little — if anything at all — towards advancing America's regional strategic objectives. The nexus, however, lives on to forestall Democrats from highlighting Republican-made Pak-Afghan policy failures.

The PPP leadership is in the game to maximize its own gains. In that sense, restoration of the judges on PML-N's terms will be a step in the wrong direction. At this juncture, I will introduce the game theory's 'perfect and imperfect information' paradigm. I submit that PPP's top leadership is taking actions based on imperfect information. To begin with, the PPP is failing to recognize the development of two other power centres in the post-March 9 Pakistan — the media and the lawyers-led civil society. I further submit that the PPP is taking actions and responding without anticipating — and modelling in — the responses of the media and civil society.

Yes, the PPP is expected to do nothing less than to maximize its own gains but there is even evidence that the PPP is playing the game based on imperfect information. The bulk of this 'imperfect information' seems to be originating from PPP's un-elected decision-makers who are not fully cognizant of ground reality. Yes, the PPP is the only party that has won seats in all the four provinces but persistent decision-making based on imperfect information does not bode well for PPP's future electoral prospects.

Pakistan's game theory may soon have another player. On May 13, Jaipur, India's 'Pink City', had blood on its streets — red blood. On May 14, "Indian military commanders lodged a new protest… with their Pakistani counterparts after soldiers came under fire from across the border for the second time in a week." At a time when Washington feels it is losing leverage over Pakistan, America may — as it has in the past — signal India to pressurize Pakistan (in order to maximize America's own gains).

Mian Nawaz Sharif, whether he knows it or not, is playing the game theory along the lines of what in political science is known as the 'median voter theorem'. The theorem states that if a politician wants to maximize his or her votes then he or she should "commit to the policy position preferred by the median voter". Rules of the game theory now dictate that isolating Nawaz would serve the interests of both the Pakistan Army and America.

Asif Ali Zardari, on the other hand, does not want to confront the presidency but is in direct confrontation with the 'median voter theorem'. True, the PPP is not in need of votes in the foreseeable future but history stands witness that a political player adamant on confronting the 'median voter theorem' stands to hurt his electoral prospects.

Mian Nawaz Sharif, whether he knows it or not, is playing the game by the rules prescribed by the 'Economic Theory of Democracy'. The theory recommends to all politicians to draw out a graph of ideological positions of voters and then to identify the median voter. The PML-N seems to have drawn out just such a graph — at least mentally — and also identified the median voter.

Asif Ali Zardari, on the other hand, is playing the same game based on strategies embedded in pure power politics, pragmatism, individual charm and realpolitik. Somehow, these strategies do not take into account the development of alternative — and intelligent — power centres, the media and civil society. And, that takes us back to game theory's 'imperfect information' paradigm.

Well, there's mathematics, applied mathematics and game theory. There also is calculus and vector calculus. Then there's geometry, trigonometry and differential geometry. There was a time when none of this was applicable to Pakistani politics. And, then the president suspended the chief justice. Don't throw game theory out the window. Remember, eight game theorists have won Nobel prizes.

The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com

US tightens its grip on Pakistan?

US tightens its grip on Pakistan
By M K Bhadrakumar

Alphonse Karr, the 19th-century French novelist and pamphleteer, is principally remembered for the epigram, "The more it changes, the more it is the same thing." That could be the thought that comes to mind at first glance of speech made by US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte at the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Pakistan forum in Washington on Monday. Yet, the speech merits attention.

In all practical terms, the speech is a final summing up but at the same time it sets outs the tone of the US policy towards Pakistan in the remaining months of the George W Bush administration. Pakistan is indeed a transformed home. New applications of new principles must be quickly forthcoming.

It is extraordinary that a seasoned diplomat like Negroponte has chosen the NED forum to make such a major speech on Pakistan. But then, "promoting democracy" - the motto of NED - also happens to be a stated objective of US policy towards Pakistan. Over the past quarter century, the US government-funded NED has specialized as a handmaiden of American regional policies.

The NED is well known for covertly funding and supporting politicians in Latin American countries with strong support to the military. Its activities in many countries are known to run parallel to those of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its sensational role in conceptualizing and orchestrating the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia was a high-water mark in the organization's history since its inception in 1983, mitigating to an extent its dismal failures in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba.

Rarely does a top diplomat speak so openly from a public forum as Negroponte did on the centrality of Pakistan for the US's national security. He spoke in Winston Churchill terms. "More than ever, our [US] national security depends on the success, security and stability of Pakistan ... We recognize that our fate - that is, our security, our freedom, our prosperity - is linked to the fate of the people of Pakistan," Negroponte said, echoing the gravitas of the British statesman during World War II.

What Negroponte implied was that Washington will categorically assure Pakistan that no matter the change of administration in the White House next year, the US commitment to a "long-term, substantial and comprehensive" partnership with Pakistan will remain a cornerstone of American regional policies.

Negroponte seems to have perceived that allies like Pakistan are increasingly beginning to look beyond the Bush administration and that is not going to do the "war on terror" in Afghanistan any good. In his recent visit to China, President Pervez Musharraf's mind desultorily wandered, inviting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to come and help stabilize the Afghan situation. But, why go to the SCO when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could still do a first rate job? The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Negroponte, therefore, proceeded to underline that in its remaining months in office, the Bush administration will endeavor to establish a new framework of political, economic and security assistance to Pakistan. He singled out military cooperation as an important feature of that partnership.

Negroponte acknowledged that the weakening or "estrangement" in the US-Pakistan alliance in the post-Cold War setting in the 1990s had led to a "strategic disconnect" between the two militaries. The result has been that there are serious limits today to the US military's capacity to influence the officer corps of the Pakistani military. That deficiency needs to be rectified. The solution lies in reviving the old practice when as Cold War allies, the US military used to engage the middle and senior ranking Pakistani military officers within the framework of a "robust training and education program" so as to establish links with them on a sustained, enduring basis.

But Negroponte implied that Washington expects the Pakistani military to reciprocate by accommodating the US's strategy in the "war on terror" in the tribal areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where military operations must continue. He said the Bush administration will have no objection in principle to the Pakistani civilian leadership's emphasis on the economic development and integration of the tribal areas, but "any kind of agreement or understanding which might be negotiated [with the Pakistani Taliban] will have to be consistent with the imperatives of the US strategy towards the war on terror".

Negroponte explained, "Whatever the approach, it's got to be multi-faceted ... it also has to include a security component. You can't let the irreconcilables, as I call them, have a free hand, have a free pass. They must be confronted." In other words, the imperatives of the US strategy are clear: Pakistan's tribal areas should cease to be a platform for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to stage cross-border attacks inside Afghanistan where US troops and other NATO troops "end up being the victims of such attacks". Therefore, the security operations must continue at any cost.

Negroponte made it clear that the US remains skeptical about the efforts of the Pakistani government to negotiate with militants in the tribal regions. He said, "I think that one would have to wait and see what is actually concluded, if such an agreement were to be concluded. Certainly, our past - our concern with past agreements regarding South Waziristan have gone to the issue of how much it really - these agreements really limited the scope of action of terrorism - of terrorists, extremist elements operating in the area, or was it some way of allowing them greater scope for action than we're comfortable with."

As could be expected, Negroponte put emphasis on Pakistan's transition to democracy as a development that is "strategically significant" insofar as the people rejected extremism by supporting moderate, pro-democratic forces and parties in the last elections, which in turn has provided an opportunity to the US to build a "broad national consensus to defeat terrorism". He reaffirmed the US commitment to strengthen Pakistani civil society and civilian institutions. On the Pakistani political scene, Negroponte singled out Asif Ali Zardari as Washington's principal interlocutor. Zardari, widower of former premier Benazir Bhutto, is co-chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, the leading party in the new ruling coalition in Islamabad.

Clearly, the Bush administration banks on a working relationship to develop between Musharraf and Zardari, which will go a long way in ensuring that Pakistan remains a dependable ally in the "war on terror" in general and in the conduct of the security operations in the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region in particular.

It is interesting that Negroponte spoke soon after talks between the Pakistani government and the so-called Pakistani Taliban broke down in late April. The impasse in the talks came about when the Taliban demanded that the Pakistani army should withdraw from Waziristan, Darra Adamkhel and Swat as a confidence-building measure prior to reaching an agreement. The Taliban insist that this was a prior commitment given by the government. They allege the US will be averse to any such withdrawal by the Pakistani military from the tribal areas and Washington has pressured the latter to resile from the earlier commitment.

Conceivably, Washington would be viewing with unease that the talks between the government and the Taliban have not completely broken down. According to the latest reports, a tribal jirga (council) comprising the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban has met with Baitullah Mahsud - almost certainly with the knowledge and tacit approval of the government. To quote noted Pakistani expert, Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Pakistani authorities are hoping that Baitullah Mahsud will use his influence to restore peace and stability in the rest of the tribal areas and the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province]." Mahsud is a hardline Pakistani Taliban leader accused of implication in Bhutto's assassination last December.

But the US priorities are diametrically opposite. The central issue for the US is, as Yusufzai pointed out, "Once the TTP [Tehrek-e-Taliban or the umbrella body of the Pakistani Taliban groups] signs a peace accord with the Pakistani government, it would be able to free its fighters to join the Afghan Taliban and launch attacks inside Afghanistan." That is to say, Washington would like the locus of the war to be kept on Pakistani soil in the tribal areas, whereas the elected government in Islamabad wants to limit and control the unrest in the tribal areas so that the NWFP or the rest of Pakistan does not get destabilized.

To complicate matters, as far as the Pakistani Taliban are concerned, they are only too willing to reach an agreement with Islamabad since their main agenda is not the "Talibanization" of Pakistan but the jihad against the US and the other "occupying forces" in Afghanistan. In Yusufzai's assessment, the Pakistani Taliban are under no illusions that they have the capacity to establish their writ in the tribal areas and NWFP, let alone the whole of Pakistan. Therefore, all that they seek at the moment is an accord that respects their interests in their strongholds, though they know that such an accord may not prove durable, given the staunch opposition to it by the US, NATO and, possibly, the Afghan government.

Negroponte's appeal from the NED forum is directly addressed to the Pakistani military. His speech underscores that fundamentally speaking, US policy continues to repose faith in the Pakistani military as its principal interlocutor in Pakistan. (In a highly nuanced parenthesis, by way of allaying the Pakistani military's apprehensions about US intentions, Negroponte added that no matter Washington's reservations in the past, "I think that you could fairly say that the United States has accepted the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and I think I would leave it at that.")

The top US diplomat has appealed to the Pakistani military brass that the security operations in the tribal areas are a "national security imperative for the United States, an essential condition for success in Afghanistan". He has, therefore, gone out of the way to give an undertaking that Washington will comprehensively take care of the Pakistani military's corporate interests on a long-term footing and provide it with modern weapons and training worthy of a close ally, provided the latter reciprocates by relentlessly conducting security operations in the tribal areas.

But the US's current problems do not end there. In immediate terms, Washington is also called on to get the elected civilian governments in Islamabad and Peshawar on board. Unsurprisingly, the elected governments are sensitive about public mood, which is anti-US and disfavors Islamabad's close association with the "war on terror". The recent elections brought to light that the US's capacity to influence Pakistani political parties, including some major ones, is severely limited. And it is here that the NED has a vital role to play in the period ahead.

The NED has gained vast experience in cajoling unwilling politicians in foreign countries to play ball with the US regional agenda. Its expertise will come in handy in building working relationships between civilian politicians and the military in Pakistan, as well as in persuading recalcitrant Pakistani politicians to see the light of reason and to cooperate with the imperatives of US strategy.

Its role will be truly decisive for US policy if Pakistan finds itself facing another parliamentary election any time soon, in case the present uneasy ruling coalition sharing power in Islamabad begins to unravel. The NED's forte lies in finessing effective ways of promoting favored politicians and political parties abroad.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

Jaipur blasts targeted ties with Pakistan: Indian Prime Minister Singh

Jaipur blasts targeted ties with Pakistan: Singh
By Jawed Naqvi, Dawn, May 18, 2008

NEW DELHI, May 17: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has warned that the recent blasts in Jaipur were of a piece with the objectives of their perpetrators to derail improving ties with Pakistan. Dr Singh also spoke on Saturday of the need to thwart these attempts with a sound strategy.

His comments suggested that the issue could be discussed this coming week during the visit to Islamabad by Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee and also possibly by Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon who is expected to fly there on Monday to review the fourth round of the India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue.

“There is no doubt that terrorist elements have many objectives — to disturb the atmosphere of communal harmony in our country, to create communal disturbances and also to prevent normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan,” Dr Singh told reporters in Bagdogra in West Bengal after wrapping up his two-day visit to Bhutan.

“We have to be mindful of these nefarious designs and we have to adopt an effective strategy to counter all these dangers,” he was quoted by Press Trust of India as saying.

Dr Singh’s observations indicated a key difference in the approach to the Jaipur blasts with the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, whose leaders have blamed Pakistan and Bangladesh without explaining how the two governments, both currently nurturing goodwill for Delhi, might have benefited.

Dr Singh was responding to a question whether the Jaipur serial blasts had vitiated the atmosphere ahead of the India-Pakistan talks in Islamabad on May 20-21.

The foreign secretary-level talks on May 20 followed by foreign ministerial talks the next day will mark resumption of the composite dialogue after more than seven months.

In the backdrop of the Jaipur blasts, terrorism will top the agenda of the talks, with India expected to raise its concern over continued infiltration from Pakistan.Earlier on Saturday, the Indian prime minister addressed the Bhutan parliament where he spoke of India’s desire to see “a South Asia which is at peace with itself. We wish to contribute to ever widening circles of security, peace and prosperity in our region,” he added.

Meanwhile the Jaipur terror attacks that left more than 60 dead and hundreds injured appeared to have become a political football between the BJP-ruled Rajasthan and the Congress-ruled federal government. The Congress has accused the BJP seeking to communalise the incident in which many Hindus and a few Muslims were killed.

“The victims need our understanding and sympathy,” Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil said. “They should be helped in every respect... Steps need be taken to take action against the perpetrators of the incidents. Those who are on this job should be helped in every respect. The Union would help the State and its police to do its duty.”

Significantly, the home minister also added: “At this point of time, nothing should be done and said which would create obstacles and misunderstanding and is unhelpful in the task of investigating agencies...For this purpose, no statement which can create misunderstanding between the agencies and governments should be made by those who are involved in doing their duties.”